The disengagement plan

international | rights, freedoms and repression | opinion/analysis Saturday July 16, 2005 16:12 by Dr. Majed Nassar - Health Work Committees - Palestine mnassar53 at yahoo dot com Beit sahour, P.O.Box 44 0097222407518

The disengagement plan:
The previous and present Governments of Israel knew for fact that they do not want to keep Gaza and the Palestinians in Gaza under their control. The question was always when, how and to what price would Israel withdraw from Gaza. In the Post-Oslo era there was for Israel no reason why it shouldn't have withdrawn from Gaza and evacuate the settlements. The Atmosphere was ready, the détente was at its peak and Rabin and Peres (and Arafat) won the Peace Nobel price. The question in deed is: Why didn't Israel between 1995 and September 2000 withdraw from Gaza and evacuated the settlements?

The Palestinians can then wait till "they turn Finns"?

The disengagement plan:
The continuation of a subtle occupation

By
Dr. Majed Nassar
Executive Director-Health Work Committees

The previous and present Governments of Israel knew for fact that they do not want to keep Gaza and the Palestinians in Gaza under their control. The question was always when, how and to what price would Israel withdraw from Gaza. In the Post-Oslo era there was for Israel no reason why it shouldn't have withdrawn from Gaza and evacuate the settlements. The Atmosphere was ready, the détente was at its peak and Rabin and Peres (and Arafat) won the Peace Nobel price. The question in deed is: Why didn't Israel between 1995 and September 2000 withdraw from Gaza and evacuated the settlements?

During the Post-Oslo years Israel never stopped its plans to tighten its grip over the occupied territories; in Particular in Jerusalem and in the West Bank.. In 1996 Netanyahu became the Minister President of Israel and in 1996 also, a new strategy for the Middle East was drawn in Washington by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. A report was prepared by the Study group on a “New Israeli Strategy toward 2000”. Some of the Authors are or were present advisors of President Bush. Among those were Richard Perle, Douglas Faith and David Wurmser. The report entitled" A Clean Break: A new strategy for securing the Realm" has some interesting points to ponder:
……The Israeli Government under Natanyahu is advised to back away from the concept of "comprehensive peace" with its neighbors and move forward toward a "peace for peace" formula.
…….Israel is advised to change the nature of its relation with the Palestinians including "the right of hot persuit" for self defense into all Palestinian areas and nurturing alternatives to Arafat….
……..A new approach to peace is presented in which the Land for peace formula, which placed Israel in the position of cultural economic, political diplomatic and military retreat, should be changed into peace for peace, peace through strength and self reliance…
……..WE in Israel cannot play innocents abroad in a world that is not innocent . Peace depends on the character and behavior of our foes. We live in a dangerous neighborhood, with fragile states and bitter rivalries. Displaying moral ambivalence between the effort to build a Jewish state and the desire to annihilate it by trading "land for Peace" will not secure peace now. Our claim to the land is legitimate and noble. It is not within our own power, no matter how much we concede, to make peace unilaterally. Only the unconditional acceptance by Arabs of our rights, especially in the territorial dimension, "peace for peace" is a solid basis for the future.

The Tunnel incident in 1996, which was short before becoming an Intifada, the partition of Hebron into H1 and H2, the building of settlements and "Jews-only" bypass roads that mushroomed in that period and fruitless negotiations, characterized the period before the Intifada September 2000. It is not just a mere coincidence with the new policies mentioned before. All the while Israel went systematically to undermine the authority of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority in general. In 1999, Barak was facing the dues of Oslo while the political establishment and decision makers in Israel have already rejected them.

While the Intifada of 1987 broke out to demand a solution for 20 years of Israeli Military occupation to the Palestinian lands, the Intifada of Sep.2000 broke out to reject an imposed and indoctrinated solution.
Barak failed after 20months in his office and the Israeli public elected General Sharon who promised to quell the Intifada in 100 days!

The Apartheid Wall was drafted before the Initfada by Barak, as it has always been the policy of the Labor government to segregate the Palestinians from the Israelis. This policy was traditionally rejected by the Likud but nowadays no longer.
The death of President Arafat took away the Israeli argument that there is no longer a Palestinian partner to talk to, as the Israelis bound their objection to negotiations with the Palestinians to the person of President Arafat. Later a demand was made that the Palestinians should hold elections, which they did and in deed they elected Mahmoud Abbas as the new President of the Palestinian authority.

Despite all efforts nationally and internationally, the Israelis and the Palestinian sides froze. Whether under combat conditions or non-combat conditions there is no serious talk. Israel rejected all initiatives all the time including the Arab Initiative from Beirut, the Tennet Plan, the Mitchel plan and only recently Israel had to accept the Road Map but not without putting some 14 remarks on it. All plans and initiatives stipulate clearly that Israel has to stop building the settlements and Israel has to freeze the existing ones and dismantle all those outposts. To counter these conditions while superficially still accepting the Road Map, Sharon initiated the unilateral disengagement plan, as if he invented the wheel from new.

Sharon started a campaign inside Israel as well as outside to market the disengagement plan. Behind the show of a struggle between Sharon and the settlers – a charade par excel lance- Sharon sold his initiative as his contribution to peace and as painful concession. The more commotion arose from this unilateral disengagement the better. Sharon can score later when he opposes further withdrawal from the West Bank. The louder Sharon and his settler cry over the removal of few settlements in the Gaza Strip, the better he can defend his rejection to remove the settlements from the West Bank.
Sharon is not worried about any security arrangements. Although there have been disagreements regarding the security situation after the withdrawal, in general however the Ex Shin Bet chief states in Haaretz from 10.6.2005 "the withdrawal will not rekindle terror". "The threat of Qassam launches at Israel from the Gaza Strip will Not be any greater after the IDF leaves Gaza, and that in fact, Israel will have greater freedom for military action if needed, because once the settlements and the IDF are out of Gaza, the number of Israeli targets in the Strip will be much smaller".

Sharon considers his unilateral withdrawal from Gaza a (only) part of his obligation toward the Road Map and links his further steps to what the Palestinian authority is going to do. The rest is cosmetics. He does this although he states that is a unilateral step. By doing so Sharon escapes possible obligations vis a vis the Palestinian authority and vis a vis the international community. Sharon went further to demand from the Palestinian authority to abide by the Israeli conditions and understanding of security; e.g. arrest the usual suspects and disarm the resistance movement. And this he sets up as a precondition for any further talks about any withdrawal from the West Bank. So even the four settlements that were declared for removal will be subject for eternal discussion until Sharon decides the Palestinians have fulfilled Israel's demands. All the while Israel goes on to expand and build more settlements and bypass roads in addition to the Apartheid Wall.

In addition, Sharon will push all possible dates for the final status negotiations until unknown dates.
Sharon knows very well that a unilateral withdrawal would allow Israel to keep its control over Gaza’s borders, land, sea and air. Sharon knows that a unilateral withdrawal without an entrance or an exit, would make Gaza the biggest prison in history as he is able to deport any inconvenient person from the West Bank to Gaza without hearing a loud cry about it. And Israel is the gate and key keeper.

Sharon knows that he is under pressure from the international community. His official support is dwindling under the pressure of the people's movements. And Sharon knows that he is losing time. Numerous calls for boycott, sanctions and divestment are coming from different parts of the world and these calls are gaining momentum.
The Bush administration is eager to reach a final peace agreement before the Bush's term is over.
Europe is pushing towards an end of the conflict. The UN is good willing but helpless and impotent vis a vis the Bush administration. The Quartet is a cosmetic body that is also bound to the sole decision of the Bush administration.
Sharon is determined to build as many obstacles as possible and he will name them "facts on the ground", so that a going back is no longer possible.
The unilateral disengagement plan is a safety net for Sharon and his future. It is his way out of the obligations of the Road Map. He knows that he has to comply with the Road Map and that there is no way out unless he uses the unilateral disengagement to kill Israel's obligations by time. Israel's governments succeeded in the past regarding the Tenet and Mitchell plan in the same way.
If the international community falls into Sharon's trap he would have gained a lot of time to colonize the West Bank without any serious deterrent.
If the international community falls into this trap, the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza will be the last withdrawal of the Israeli army. The rest will be simple army redeployments as to what extent the Apartheid Wall can serve.
If the international community falls into this trap there will be no Palestinian state in the future. The Palestinians can then wait till "they turn Finns"?