Editor's note: There's a limit to how many artillery shells the US can send (only has 3-4 million left in storage). But the number can be increased if cluster-filled shells that are slated for destruction are sent to Ukraine instead. Now a Turkish precedent exists for the US to follow.

---

Turkey began sending Ukraine a form of U.S.-designed, artillery-fired cluster bomb in late 2022 after months of Kyiv pleading with the Biden administration for the munitions, current and former U.S. and European officials familiar with the decision told Foreign Policy, giving Kyiv a powerful—but controversial—weapon to destroy Russian tanks and kill troops on the battlefield.

The NATO ally began sending the first batches of so-called dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs) in November 2022, which were made during the Cold War era under a co-production agreement with the United States. The weapons are designed to destroy tanks by bursting into smaller submunitions, which can linger on the battlefield for years if they do not immediately explode. Each round scatters about 88 bomblets. The United States is barred from exporting DPICMs under U.S. law because of its high dud rate.

The move, which Turkey has sought to keep quiet for months, also highlights the high-wire act that Ankara has played throughout the conflict: supporting Ukraine with armed Bayraktar TB2 drones that helped break Russia’s advance on Kyiv and playing diplomatic middleman for the United Nations-brokered deal to export grain from the Ukrainian port of Odesa, all while purchasing Russian weapons for itself and angering NATO in the process. It was not immediately clear if the Turkish surface-to-surface weapons had been used in combat.

“After the U.S. denied [Ukraine] access to cluster munitions, Turkey was the only place they could get them,” said one source briefed on the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “It just shows how even as Turkey cozies up to Russia in some respects, it’s become a really important supporter for Ukraine militarily.”

Neither the Turkish Embassy in Washington nor the Ukrainian defense ministry responded to Foreign Policy’s request for comment. But Turkey’s delivery of DPICMs showcases how Ankara has played an outsized role in supplying weapons to Ukraine to break Russia’s full-scale invasion at critical moments in the war since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the assault in February 2022.

The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones helped halt Russian armored convoys converging on Kyiv in the early days of the war, and they reportedly had a role in assisting Ukraine’s sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva, then the flagship of the Black Sea fleet. Turkish analysts also believe that Turkey is quietly running a drone bridge from Corlu air base near the Bayraktar TB2 factory, where weapons are shipped to Poland and moved to Ukraine. And Turkey has walked a tight line on weapons deliveries: Even as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his brass in Ankara have tried to keep them quiet, some of their close confidantes—including the president’s son-in-law, who is chair of the board of the company that manufactures Bayraktar TB2s—have openly championed the drone’s prowess on the battlefield.

Although Turkey has not shared information on the quantities of cluster munitions in its stockpile, the Ankara-based Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation has produced an extended-range artillery projectile in the past that can be fired out of 155 mm cannons with self-destructing DPICM submunitions as well as similar projectiles that are under license from the United States. Roketsan, another major Turkish weapons producer, once made TRK-122 rockets for 122 mm artillery systems that also scatter DPICM submunitions. Slovakia, Chile, and the United States have transferred cluster munitions to Turkey in the past.

But the move still is a reversal of sorts for Turkey, after it made pledges to the international disarmament community that it would not use cluster munitions. In a letter sent to the president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a Geneva-based international organization, in October 2021 and obtained by Foreign Policy, Turkey insisted that it had not used, produced, imported, or transferred cluster munitions since 2005—when the convention was implemented—and did not intend to do so in the future.

“Turkey, indeed, shares the humanitarian considerations that guide the efforts to limit the indiscriminate use of weapons, including cluster munitions,” Sadik Arslan, Turkey’s ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, wrote in the letter to the convention.

Yet people who have advocated for the United States to send DPICMs have insisted that it would be the most effective way to root out Russian trench lines, which are not reinforced or covered, in the open terrain of the Donbas. And the need is compounded, those advocates said, by U.S. stockpiles already running low on high explosive artillery rounds. (U.S. officials also believe Russian artillery fire may have declined as much as 75 percent from its wartime high.)

Turkey, like the United States, is not a member of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Yet experts fear that the cleanup headache that DPICMs could cause might exacerbate the generational mine and cluster bomb mess that the Russian military has already left nearly a year after the Kremlin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Unlike traditional landmines, cluster munitions aren’t often neatly planted in rows that can be easily surveyed and cleared. Rather, they scatter more randomly when fired and have a high dud rate. Experts worry that because of its small size, akin to a D-cell battery, they are too unsafe to destroy en masse, and innocent civilians could mistakenly pick them up, something that happened during the 2006 Lebanon War.

“Ukraine already has a massive problem on its hands, and it’s only magnifying it by introducing this weapon,” Hiznay said. “They’re going to end up with a situation where the contamination is like lasagna: It’s layered upon each other over time.”

Editor's note: There's a limit to how many artillery shells the US can send (only has 3-4 million left in storage). But the number can be increased if cluster-filled shells that are slated for destruction are sent to Ukraine instead. Now a Turkish precedent exists for the US to follow.

---

Turkey began sending Ukraine a form of U.S.-designed, artillery-fired cluster bomb in late 2022 after months of Kyiv pleading with the Biden administration for the munitions, current and former U.S. and European officials familiar with the decision told Foreign Policy, giving Kyiv a powerful—but controversial—weapon to destroy Russian tanks and kill troops on the battlefield.

The NATO ally began sending the first batches of so-called dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs) in November 2022, which were made during the Cold War era under a co-production agreement with the United States. The weapons are designed to destroy tanks by bursting into smaller submunitions, which can linger on the battlefield for years if they do not immediately explode. Each round scatters about 88 bomblets. The United States is barred from exporting DPICMs under U.S. law because of its high dud rate.

The move, which Turkey has sought to keep quiet for months, also highlights the high-wire act that Ankara has played throughout the conflict: supporting Ukraine with armed Bayraktar TB2 drones that helped break Russia’s advance on Kyiv and playing diplomatic middleman for the United Nations-brokered deal to export grain from the Ukrainian port of Odesa, all while purchasing Russian weapons for itself and angering NATO in the process. It was not immediately clear if the Turkish surface-to-surface weapons had been used in combat.

“After the U.S. denied [Ukraine] access to cluster munitions, Turkey was the only place they could get them,” said one source briefed on the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “It just shows how even as Turkey cozies up to Russia in some respects, it’s become a really important supporter for Ukraine militarily.”

Neither the Turkish Embassy in Washington nor the Ukrainian defense ministry responded to Foreign Policy’s request for comment. But Turkey’s delivery of DPICMs showcases how Ankara has played an outsized role in supplying weapons to Ukraine to break Russia’s full-scale invasion at critical moments in the war since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the assault in February 2022.

The Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones helped halt Russian armored convoys converging on Kyiv in the early days of the war, and they reportedly had a role in assisting Ukraine’s sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva, then the flagship of the Black Sea fleet. Turkish analysts also believe that Turkey is quietly running a drone bridge from Corlu air base near the Bayraktar TB2 factory, where weapons are shipped to Poland and moved to Ukraine. And Turkey has walked a tight line on weapons deliveries: Even as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his brass in Ankara have tried to keep them quiet, some of their close confidantes—including the president’s son-in-law, who is chair of the board of the company that manufactures Bayraktar TB2s—have openly championed the drone’s prowess on the battlefield.

Although Turkey has not shared information on the quantities of cluster munitions in its stockpile, the Ankara-based Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation has produced an extended-range artillery projectile in the past that can be fired out of 155 mm cannons with self-destructing DPICM submunitions as well as similar projectiles that are under license from the United States. Roketsan, another major Turkish weapons producer, once made TRK-122 rockets for 122 mm artillery systems that also scatter DPICM submunitions. Slovakia, Chile, and the United States have transferred cluster munitions to Turkey in the past.

But the move still is a reversal of sorts for Turkey, after it made pledges to the international disarmament community that it would not use cluster munitions. In a letter sent to the president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a Geneva-based international organization, in October 2021 and obtained by Foreign Policy, Turkey insisted that it had not used, produced, imported, or transferred cluster munitions since 2005—when the convention was implemented—and did not intend to do so in the future.

“Turkey, indeed, shares the humanitarian considerations that guide the efforts to limit the indiscriminate use of weapons, including cluster munitions,” Sadik Arslan, Turkey’s ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, wrote in the letter to the convention.

Yet people who have advocated for the United States to send DPICMs have insisted that it would be the most effective way to root out Russian trench lines, which are not reinforced or covered, in the open terrain of the Donbas. And the need is compounded, those advocates said, by U.S. stockpiles already running low on high explosive artillery rounds. (U.S. officials also believe Russian artillery fire may have declined as much as 75 percent from its wartime high.)

Turkey, like the United States, is not a member of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Yet experts fear that the cleanup headache that DPICMs could cause might exacerbate the generational mine and cluster bomb mess that the Russian military has already left nearly a year after the Kremlin ordered a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Unlike traditional landmines, cluster munitions aren’t often neatly planted in rows that can be easily surveyed and cleared. Rather, they scatter more randomly when fired and have a high dud rate. Experts worry that because of its small size, akin to a D-cell battery, they are too unsafe to destroy en masse, and innocent civilians could mistakenly pick them up, something that happened during the 2006 Lebanon War.

“Ukraine already has a massive problem on its hands, and it’s only magnifying it by introducing this weapon,” Hiznay said. “They’re going to end up with a situation where the contamination is like lasagna: It’s layered upon each other over time.”

Source: The Times of Israel

Russia is preparing to provide Iran with Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets in the near future, according to a Saturday report citing Western intelligence officials.

The report by Channel 12 said the deal could include as many as 24 jets that were originally intended for Egypt, in a deal that the United States thwarted.

This left Moscow looking for a new potential buyer, which it has reportedly found in Tehran. The report comes after Iranian media said in September that Tehran was weighing such a purchase.

Intelligence indicated that Iranian pilots were already using the jets for training, the report said, without elaborating.

Washington has described an extensive relationship between Iran and Russia involving military equipment, especially since Russian troops invaded Ukraine in February.

Reports indicate that Tehran has so far supplied Russian troops with some 1,700 offensive drones and plans on supplying 300 more in the near future.

Mossad chief David Barnea cautioned on Thursday that Iran is looking to expand its supply of advanced weapons to Russia.

Barnea said Mossad was “still warning about Iran’s future and intentions, which it is trying to keep secret.”

Source: The Times of Israel

Russia is preparing to provide Iran with Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets in the near future, according to a Saturday report citing Western intelligence officials.

The report by Channel 12 said the deal could include as many as 24 jets that were originally intended for Egypt, in a deal that the United States thwarted.

This left Moscow looking for a new potential buyer, which it has reportedly found in Tehran. The report comes after Iranian media said in September that Tehran was weighing such a purchase.

Intelligence indicated that Iranian pilots were already using the jets for training, the report said, without elaborating.

Washington has described an extensive relationship between Iran and Russia involving military equipment, especially since Russian troops invaded Ukraine in February.

Reports indicate that Tehran has so far supplied Russian troops with some 1,700 offensive drones and plans on supplying 300 more in the near future.

Mossad chief David Barnea cautioned on Thursday that Iran is looking to expand its supply of advanced weapons to Russia.

Barnea said Mossad was “still warning about Iran’s future and intentions, which it is trying to keep secret.”

As part of its latest military reform and expansion, Russia will raise the draft age from 18 to 21.

I wrote in October that since Putin has decided that 18-year-old conscripts are politically undeployable it makes no sense to keep them in the army:

It is difficult to see why the draft is going ahead at all. Logically conscripts should have been committed to war from day 1, before the mobilization was even decreed. But since Putin has now decreed mobilization, but maintains that serving conscripts remain non-deployable they have become dead weight.

The capacity of any military to equip, train and integrate men is limited. Especially in short order and on a budget. Every conscript is taking up training ground capacity, instructor time, equipment, weapon, and a slot in an existing unit that could have gone to a mobik, but only one of the two is actually deployable.

If Russia is in a war (is she??), it is pointless for her to be inducting into the military masses of personnel who are a priori banned from the war. Especially when those who are deployed are short of everything.

If Putin insists that conscripts are non-deployable (an absurd stance) then they don’t have a role in the military. At least for the heavily pressured land combat arms, if they can not be part of the rotation then there is very little rationale to spend resources on them. Logic dictates that draft ought to be suspended indefinitely and the freed-up resources spent on mobiki.

Instead of abolishing mandatory military service, Moscow will make the draft kick in at 21 years of age. This will produce conscript soldiers that are politically more deployable than the current crop of 18-year-olds.

However, the vast majority of current 21-year-olds have already served when they were 18 or 19 and can’t be recalled for a 2nd term. So even in theory, this reform can’t kick in for at least 3 more years when the present unrecruited 17 and 18-year-olds turn 21.

In practice it will take even longer. RUMOD says the age will be raised gradually — because the military doesn’t want to go 3 years with zero conscripts.

For example, if each class is retained for 18 months, rather than the current 12, then each next class can be 6 months older than the previous.

So then in about 3 to 9 years, Russia will finally have a conscript corps that Putin is politically comfortable using in Ukraine.

Better late than never?

VVP has been in power for 23 years. Donbass War started 8 years ago. And the Ukraine War 1 year ago.

Some might build an army ahead of a war. Putin started an “SMO”. Waited a year. Then started the reform that will produce an army for the SMO in 3 to 9 years.

The whole idea of having 250,000 trained conscripts integrated into your armed forces but then when the war comes having the units that will go to war expel them from their ranks and leave them at home is bizarre.

It is such a bizarre idea that in February when the first reports were coming in that the Russian military had gone in without its conscript component, I disregarded them. — Something that dumb was just too insane to believe.

It’s not until March that I tackle the conscript blunder head-on:

This conscript ban (if real) is yet another way in which Putin is hamstringing the military and thinking he can wage a halfway war.

There is actually something very disturbing about that. Putin’s thesis is that a Russian-Ukrainian war is a fratricidal war between brothers, between one and the same people even. So what excuse is there for Russia to not do everything in her power to create the overmatch that puts Ukraine out of its misery quickly?

What possible excuse can there be to juggle the needs of the war against trifles such as the state breaking its word to conscripts and their mothers? (A state that lies all the time BTW, as they all do.) All this seeming high-minded stuff Putin started the war with sounds nice enough on paper, but what it does in the real world is prolong the bloodletting and ultimately drives up the price for everyone involved.

If you are truly high-minded then just don’t escalate.

But if you do escalate, then do it the correct way — going all in and giving it your all.

No willful self-delusion. No drawing up of a plan that has the theoretical potential of delivering a near bloodless resolution, but that has nearly zero chance of actually panning out. (And leaves you maldeployed when it fails.) Draw a plan that is actually going to work in the real world that limits the loss of life as much as possible within the constraints of an actually workable, realistic plan.

Now that a year into the war Ukraine has doubled the size of its armed forces, and Russia has belatedly mobilized, whether 150,00 Russian conscripts in the land combat arms are deployed or not is something of a moot point. It won’t mean much either way.

But Moscow falling upon Ukraine in February with the 200,000 it brought, or with the 350,000 it could have brought, could have made a world of difference at the time. You’re talking about the difference between sending the Russian ground army to face roughly equal numbers and sending it to face half its number.

That’s the difference between setting up an early slugfest and setting up early victories that are almost trivially easy.

Do that and you’re entering 2023 in a completely different position with Kharkov and Zaporozhye in Russian encirclement, with Russia still having a bridgehead on the right bank, and with Nikolayev and Dnipro probably likewise encircled.

As part of its latest military reform and expansion, Russia will raise the draft age from 18 to 21.

I wrote in October that since Putin has decided that 18-year-old conscripts are politically undeployable it makes no sense to keep them in the army:

It is difficult to see why the draft is going ahead at all. Logically conscripts should have been committed to war from day 1, before the mobilization was even decreed. But since Putin has now decreed mobilization, but maintains that serving conscripts remain non-deployable they have become dead weight.

The capacity of any military to equip, train and integrate men is limited. Especially in short order and on a budget. Every conscript is taking up training ground capacity, instructor time, equipment, weapon, and a slot in an existing unit that could have gone to a mobik, but only one of the two is actually deployable.

If Russia is in a war (is she??), it is pointless for her to be inducting into the military masses of personnel who are a priori banned from the war. Especially when those who are deployed are short of everything.

If Putin insists that conscripts are non-deployable (an absurd stance) then they don’t have a role in the military. At least for the heavily pressured land combat arms, if they can not be part of the rotation then there is very little rationale to spend resources on them. Logic dictates that draft ought to be suspended indefinitely and the freed-up resources spent on mobiki.

Instead of abolishing mandatory military service, Moscow will make the draft kick in at 21 years of age. This will produce conscript soldiers that are politically more deployable than the current crop of 18-year-olds.

However, the vast majority of current 21-year-olds have already served when they were 18 or 19 and can’t be recalled for a 2nd term. So even in theory, this reform can’t kick in for at least 3 more years when the present unrecruited 17 and 18-year-olds turn 21.

In practice it will take even longer. RUMOD says the age will be raised gradually — because the military doesn’t want to go 3 years with zero conscripts.

For example, if each class is retained for 18 months, rather than the current 12, then each next class can be 6 months older than the previous.

So then in about 3 to 9 years, Russia will finally have a conscript corps that Putin is politically comfortable using in Ukraine.

Better late than never?

VVP has been in power for 23 years. Donbass War started 8 years ago. And the Ukraine War 1 year ago.

Some might build an army ahead of a war. Putin started an “SMO”. Waited a year. Then started the reform that will produce an army for the SMO in 3 to 9 years.

The whole idea of having 250,000 trained conscripts integrated into your armed forces but then when the war comes having the units that will go to war expel them from their ranks and leave them at home is bizarre.

It is such a bizarre idea that in February when the first reports were coming in that the Russian military had gone in without its conscript component, I disregarded them. — Something that dumb was just too insane to believe.

It’s not until March that I tackle the conscript blunder head-on:

This conscript ban (if real) is yet another way in which Putin is hamstringing the military and thinking he can wage a halfway war.

There is actually something very disturbing about that. Putin’s thesis is that a Russian-Ukrainian war is a fratricidal war between brothers, between one and the same people even. So what excuse is there for Russia to not do everything in her power to create the overmatch that puts Ukraine out of its misery quickly?

What possible excuse can there be to juggle the needs of the war against trifles such as the state breaking its word to conscripts and their mothers? (A state that lies all the time BTW, as they all do.) All this seeming high-minded stuff Putin started the war with sounds nice enough on paper, but what it does in the real world is prolong the bloodletting and ultimately drives up the price for everyone involved.

If you are truly high-minded then just don’t escalate.

But if you do escalate, then do it the correct way — going all in and giving it your all.

No willful self-delusion. No drawing up of a plan that has the theoretical potential of delivering a near bloodless resolution, but that has nearly zero chance of actually panning out. (And leaves you maldeployed when it fails.) Draw a plan that is actually going to work in the real world that limits the loss of life as much as possible within the constraints of an actually workable, realistic plan.

Now that a year into the war Ukraine has doubled the size of its armed forces, and Russia has belatedly mobilized, whether 150,00 Russian conscripts in the land combat arms are deployed or not is something of a moot point. It won’t mean much either way.

But Moscow falling upon Ukraine in February with the 200,000 it brought, or with the 350,000 it could have brought, could have made a world of difference at the time. You’re talking about the difference between sending the Russian ground army to face roughly equal numbers and sending it to face half its number.

That’s the difference between setting up an early slugfest and setting up early victories that are almost trivially easy.

Do that and you’re entering 2023 in a completely different position with Kharkov and Zaporozhye in Russian encirclement, with Russia still having a bridgehead on the right bank, and with Nikolayev and Dnipro probably likewise encircled.

Source: Voennoe Obozrenie

Machine translated from Russian

The repair plant needed by the front went under the hammer for metal

Despite all the arguments and requests of the committee to save the plant, headed by the former director, Colonel Alexander Shinkarenko, Rostec sold the 9th CARZ for its further disposal.

Let's start with an article on the Military Review, which was read by almost a million people and which caused a strong reaction.

Why does GABTU not want to repair military equipment? Yes, the web archive because we had to pull the article from publication.

What started next?

Then there was a wave raised by several media and Saratov TV channels, the governor of the Saratov region Roman Busargin stood up for the plant, it came to Moscow.

In general, everything was quite joyful and promising: the governor was “for” the revival of the plant, these are jobs, this is money for the budget, in general, everyone who fought for CARH No. 9 noted the active and positive work of Roman Busargin. He raised the deputies of the State Duma, the deputies got involved in the work, there was a meeting with Volodin, who promised to support fellow countrymen (Volodin himself was a native of the Saratov region) and kept his word.

On November 1, 2022, State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin meets with Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov.

Many people talked about this, it’s enough for us that State Duma deputy Nikolai Pankov wrote on his telegram channel and another deputy, Alexander Strelyukhin, whom Volodin appointed to oversee the issues of CARZ No. 9 and the locomotive plant, gave an interview in which he said:

"Vyacheslav Viktorovich instructed to take this topic into work. Grateful for the trust. She is very close to me, she worked as a director at the Locomotive Plant, she is also well acquainted with the activities of the 9th CARZ. Ready to work for results."

 

What Volodin and Chemezov were talking about, we will never know. And the result was as follows: in the fire order, CARZ No. 9 was sold.

But before that, following the results of the meeting, a commission was sent to the plant, headed by a representative of KamAZ JSC Petrushenko D.V., Remdiesel employees took part in the commission.

The commission, having visited the plant, presented a report from which it followed that there was nothing at the plant except for two drunken guards and three dogs. The information was received by the initiator of the revival of the plant, Colonel Shinkarenko, from the representative of JSC "High Precision Complexes" Ryazantsev, who was also contacted with the issue of taking CARZ No. 9 under his wing. Ryazantsev was surprised when Shinkarenko presented him with documents showing that instead of one plant there were TWO, since CARZ No. 9 also has a branch in the city of Samara, the former 16th ARZ. And five hundred items of equipment and property.

 

In general - not only walls.

JSC "NPO High Precision Complexes" did not believe the reports of "KamAZ" and sent its commission, headed by A.V. Shevtsov. True, "Complexes" would need a plant with high-tech machines for the production of spare parts, therefore it did not grow together with the VTK, to our great regret.

Sale

And on December 30, 2022, information was published (Appendix 1) that JSC "9 CARH" was sold to a private entrepreneur from Tver, Zaitsev Nikolai Kirillovich.

IP Zaitsev Nikolai Kirillovich was registered on March 14, 2022.

It is difficult to judge how the declared retail trade via the Internet was carried out by IE Zaitsev, apparently to the envy of many, because Zaitsev laid out the 245,035,555 rubles 55 kopecks offered by him as the only bidder for the plant.

However, it follows from the text that IP Zaitsev acts in the interests of Engelssky Metal LLC (clause 6 on sheet No. 2).

 

As follows from the site, the company does not repair equipment. And the plant acquires solely in order to destroy it. For Engels Metall has been operating in the market of ferrous and non-ferrous metals since 2018 and is part of the financial and industrial group of companies.

Dismantling of metal structures, buildings and structures is an integral part of the process of selling rolled metal, harvesting and processing scrap. EM has a lot of experience in this area.”

And as last year, the girls from the press service of RT-Capital assured me ... How they try to find a buyer for a completely unnecessary and unprofitable plant in such a way as to save and increase, continue operation, and so on.

The plant was sold for subsequent destruction. If you follow link No. 1, then there, in the text of the document, you can see a link to a list of everything that is included in the lot.

And there you can see more than 400 positions. Buildings, machinery, machines, cranes... It's worth taking a look at the list to see how it fits "blank walls".

The initial price of Lot No. 1 is 288,274,901.40 rubles. IP Zaitsev offered 245,035,555.55 rubles on December 23, 2022, and his offer was accepted immediately (December 26, 2022), about which a protocol was drawn up, certified by both the seal and the electronic signature of the auction organizer.

And this is where the questions begin.

According to the certificate submitted to the governor of the Saratov region, the authorized capital of JSC "9 CARZ" together with a branch in Samara is 817,668.0 million rubles.

Accounts payable is: 1,211,137,996 rubles. A huge figure, but:

- debt to the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation - 738,531,229 rubles;
- debt to the State Corporation "RosTech" - 450,816,061 rubles;
- the share of other creditors accounts for 21,790,675 rubles.

It turns out that the amount offered for the liquidation of the plant is about a fifth of the entire debt.

The plant, which could be repaired according to a certificate signed by Colonel Alexander Shinkarenko, the capacity of the plant, even after they were reviewed by the bankruptcy trustee, remained such that it would be possible to repair up to 300 BMP-1 or BMP-2 vehicles a year when working in one shift and 450-500 machines when working in two shifts.

Shinkarenko is sure that it is realistic to equip the plant to work in two shifts. And then the combat vehicles can be repaired at a small distance from the front line.

Let's take the railway junction of Likhaya station as the point of departure, as a place capable of loading equipment onto platforms with maximum speed and convenience and having the ability to send equipment to different regions of the country.

From Likhoi to Engels by rail about 650 km. Let's look at the factories that will be able to repair the same infantry fighting vehicles.

The nearest one is 163 BTRZ in st. Kushchevskaya, Krasnodar Territory. But this relatively new repair plant (2009) is a structural subdivision of Uralvagonzavod, that is, it is focused primarily on tanks .

Next, we have the 114th BTRZ in the city of Yekaterinburg. Almost 2000 km from Likhoi.

And the last place is 560 armored personnel carriers in the village of Vozzhaevka, Belogorsk district, Amur region. About 6,000 km.

For certain reasons (government order for the production of new equipment), we do not even consider KurganMashZavod.

Obviously, the plant in Engels could save just a lot of money and (which is no less important) time on transporting broken equipment to the place of repair.

Oh yes, I forgot. We will build two new repair plants! And in a couple of years they will definitely build it.

***

I am very grateful to fate for giving me the opportunity to at least somehow help real people with a capital letter - the council of veterans of the 9th CARZ, headed by a real officer. Comrade Colonel Alexander Shinkarenko will forever remain for me an example of honor and service to his army. I was very glad to be in the same trench with him.

And I am very happy for the residents of the Saratov region, who have such a governor. Roman Busargin is an example of how to rush into battle for the interests of your region. Unfortunately, even the powers and capabilities of the governor are not enough.

Links:
Bidding results .
IP Zaitsev, who bought the
Engels metal plant

Source: Voennoe Obozrenie

Machine translated from Russian

The repair plant needed by the front went under the hammer for metal

Despite all the arguments and requests of the committee to save the plant, headed by the former director, Colonel Alexander Shinkarenko, Rostec sold the 9th CARZ for its further disposal.

Let's start with an article on the Military Review, which was read by almost a million people and which caused a strong reaction.

Why does GABTU not want to repair military equipment? Yes, the web archive because we had to pull the article from publication.

What started next?

Then there was a wave raised by several media and Saratov TV channels, the governor of the Saratov region Roman Busargin stood up for the plant, it came to Moscow.

In general, everything was quite joyful and promising: the governor was “for” the revival of the plant, these are jobs, this is money for the budget, in general, everyone who fought for CARH No. 9 noted the active and positive work of Roman Busargin. He raised the deputies of the State Duma, the deputies got involved in the work, there was a meeting with Volodin, who promised to support fellow countrymen (Volodin himself was a native of the Saratov region) and kept his word.

On November 1, 2022, State Duma Chairman Vyacheslav Volodin meets with Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov.

Many people talked about this, it’s enough for us that State Duma deputy Nikolai Pankov wrote on his telegram channel and another deputy, Alexander Strelyukhin, whom Volodin appointed to oversee the issues of CARZ No. 9 and the locomotive plant, gave an interview in which he said:

"Vyacheslav Viktorovich instructed to take this topic into work. Grateful for the trust. She is very close to me, she worked as a director at the Locomotive Plant, she is also well acquainted with the activities of the 9th CARZ. Ready to work for results."

 

What Volodin and Chemezov were talking about, we will never know. And the result was as follows: in the fire order, CARZ No. 9 was sold.

But before that, following the results of the meeting, a commission was sent to the plant, headed by a representative of KamAZ JSC Petrushenko D.V., Remdiesel employees took part in the commission.

The commission, having visited the plant, presented a report from which it followed that there was nothing at the plant except for two drunken guards and three dogs. The information was received by the initiator of the revival of the plant, Colonel Shinkarenko, from the representative of JSC "High Precision Complexes" Ryazantsev, who was also contacted with the issue of taking CARZ No. 9 under his wing. Ryazantsev was surprised when Shinkarenko presented him with documents showing that instead of one plant there were TWO, since CARZ No. 9 also has a branch in the city of Samara, the former 16th ARZ. And five hundred items of equipment and property.

 

In general - not only walls.

JSC "NPO High Precision Complexes" did not believe the reports of "KamAZ" and sent its commission, headed by A.V. Shevtsov. True, "Complexes" would need a plant with high-tech machines for the production of spare parts, therefore it did not grow together with the VTK, to our great regret.

Sale

And on December 30, 2022, information was published (Appendix 1) that JSC "9 CARH" was sold to a private entrepreneur from Tver, Zaitsev Nikolai Kirillovich.

IP Zaitsev Nikolai Kirillovich was registered on March 14, 2022.

It is difficult to judge how the declared retail trade via the Internet was carried out by IE Zaitsev, apparently to the envy of many, because Zaitsev laid out the 245,035,555 rubles 55 kopecks offered by him as the only bidder for the plant.

However, it follows from the text that IP Zaitsev acts in the interests of Engelssky Metal LLC (clause 6 on sheet No. 2).

 

As follows from the site, the company does not repair equipment. And the plant acquires solely in order to destroy it. For Engels Metall has been operating in the market of ferrous and non-ferrous metals since 2018 and is part of the financial and industrial group of companies.

Dismantling of metal structures, buildings and structures is an integral part of the process of selling rolled metal, harvesting and processing scrap. EM has a lot of experience in this area.”

And as last year, the girls from the press service of RT-Capital assured me ... How they try to find a buyer for a completely unnecessary and unprofitable plant in such a way as to save and increase, continue operation, and so on.

The plant was sold for subsequent destruction. If you follow link No. 1, then there, in the text of the document, you can see a link to a list of everything that is included in the lot.

And there you can see more than 400 positions. Buildings, machinery, machines, cranes... It's worth taking a look at the list to see how it fits "blank walls".

The initial price of Lot No. 1 is 288,274,901.40 rubles. IP Zaitsev offered 245,035,555.55 rubles on December 23, 2022, and his offer was accepted immediately (December 26, 2022), about which a protocol was drawn up, certified by both the seal and the electronic signature of the auction organizer.

And this is where the questions begin.

According to the certificate submitted to the governor of the Saratov region, the authorized capital of JSC "9 CARZ" together with a branch in Samara is 817,668.0 million rubles.

Accounts payable is: 1,211,137,996 rubles. A huge figure, but:

- debt to the Federal Tax Service of the Russian Federation - 738,531,229 rubles;
- debt to the State Corporation "RosTech" - 450,816,061 rubles;
- the share of other creditors accounts for 21,790,675 rubles.

It turns out that the amount offered for the liquidation of the plant is about a fifth of the entire debt.

The plant, which could be repaired according to a certificate signed by Colonel Alexander Shinkarenko, the capacity of the plant, even after they were reviewed by the bankruptcy trustee, remained such that it would be possible to repair up to 300 BMP-1 or BMP-2 vehicles a year when working in one shift and 450-500 machines when working in two shifts.

Shinkarenko is sure that it is realistic to equip the plant to work in two shifts. And then the combat vehicles can be repaired at a small distance from the front line.

Let's take the railway junction of Likhaya station as the point of departure, as a place capable of loading equipment onto platforms with maximum speed and convenience and having the ability to send equipment to different regions of the country.

From Likhoi to Engels by rail about 650 km. Let's look at the factories that will be able to repair the same infantry fighting vehicles.

The nearest one is 163 BTRZ in st. Kushchevskaya, Krasnodar Territory. But this relatively new repair plant (2009) is a structural subdivision of Uralvagonzavod, that is, it is focused primarily on tanks .

Next, we have the 114th BTRZ in the city of Yekaterinburg. Almost 2000 km from Likhoi.

And the last place is 560 armored personnel carriers in the village of Vozzhaevka, Belogorsk district, Amur region. About 6,000 km.

For certain reasons (government order for the production of new equipment), we do not even consider KurganMashZavod.

Obviously, the plant in Engels could save just a lot of money and (which is no less important) time on transporting broken equipment to the place of repair.

Oh yes, I forgot. We will build two new repair plants! And in a couple of years they will definitely build it.

***

I am very grateful to fate for giving me the opportunity to at least somehow help real people with a capital letter - the council of veterans of the 9th CARZ, headed by a real officer. Comrade Colonel Alexander Shinkarenko will forever remain for me an example of honor and service to his army. I was very glad to be in the same trench with him.

And I am very happy for the residents of the Saratov region, who have such a governor. Roman Busargin is an example of how to rush into battle for the interests of your region. Unfortunately, even the powers and capabilities of the governor are not enough.

Links:
Bidding results .
IP Zaitsev, who bought the
Engels metal plant

Source: Axios

The U.S. is following the lead of Venezuela's opposition lawmakers and no longer considering Juan Guaidó as the country's legitimate leader after the opposition-controlled National Assembly voted to dissolve the interim government, a senior U.S. State Department official confirmed to Axios on Wednesday.

Guaidó never truly held the levers of power in Caracas, and his support with the public and within the fractured opposition had been slipping for years. But U.S. policy and, crucially, the opposition's claim to billions in Venezuelan assets overseas, were still based around the premise of Guaidó's legitimacy.

Opposition lawmakers voted 72-29 on Friday to pull the plug on the "interim presidency," four years after the Trump administration and dozens of other countries had backed Guaidó's bid to displace Nicolás Maduro.

• Guaidó's allies warned that the move would compromise the opposition's international legitimacy and risk the overseas assets falling into Maduro's hands.
• But others in the opposition noted that Guaidó's government had failed to produce democratic elections and was never intended to be permanent.

The step put the U.S. in an awkward position. While the Biden administration has softened its approach to Maduro and promoted dialogue with the regime, it had continued to treat Guaidó as its primary interlocutor — even as governments in Europe and Latin America stopped recognizing him.

• After the vote, spokespeople for the White House and State Department declined to say directly whether the U.S. was dropping its recognition of Guaidó. Instead, they said the U.S. recognized the National Assembly elected in 2015, which Guaidó had led, as Venezuela's "only remaining democratically elected institution."
• However, the senior State Department official told Axios on Wednesday: "The 2015 National Assembly recognizes Guaidó as one of its members, not as Interim President, as the Interim Government no longer exists. So we’re following their lead."
• "The National Assembly is currently in the midst of making internal decisions regarding its own leadership, so we’re going to wait and see how that plays out," the official said.
• The U.S. will continue to communicate with Guaidó and other "likeminded" members of the opposition, the official added.

Guaidó's presidency became a "self-perpetuating thesis," said Phil Gunson, an International Crisis Group analyst in Caracas.

• His mission to quickly replace Maduro had failed, he'd lost public confidence, and he lacked the support of three of the four major opposition factions — but his international backing and control of some government assets seemed to make him immovable, Gunson told Axios.

• Finally, though, opposition lawmakers decided to "chop off the afflicted limb" and accept the "painful" consequences, Gunson said, adding that it remains to be seen whether the dissolution of the interim government will have any bearing on court cases regarding gold reserves held in the U.K. or control of oil refiner Citgo.

The National Assembly, which convenes over Zoom because much of the opposition is now in exile, is expected to select its new leadership this week.

• While Guaidó derived his claim to the presidency on the assembly leader's place in the presidential line of succession, that model has now been scrapped.
• The opposition remains divided and appears unlikely to rally around one single figure in the near term. There may be no clear opposition leader until candidates are selected for the presidential elections planned for 2024.

Source: Axios

The U.S. is following the lead of Venezuela's opposition lawmakers and no longer considering Juan Guaidó as the country's legitimate leader after the opposition-controlled National Assembly voted to dissolve the interim government, a senior U.S. State Department official confirmed to Axios on Wednesday.

Guaidó never truly held the levers of power in Caracas, and his support with the public and within the fractured opposition had been slipping for years. But U.S. policy and, crucially, the opposition's claim to billions in Venezuelan assets overseas, were still based around the premise of Guaidó's legitimacy.

Opposition lawmakers voted 72-29 on Friday to pull the plug on the "interim presidency," four years after the Trump administration and dozens of other countries had backed Guaidó's bid to displace Nicolás Maduro.

• Guaidó's allies warned that the move would compromise the opposition's international legitimacy and risk the overseas assets falling into Maduro's hands.
• But others in the opposition noted that Guaidó's government had failed to produce democratic elections and was never intended to be permanent.

The step put the U.S. in an awkward position. While the Biden administration has softened its approach to Maduro and promoted dialogue with the regime, it had continued to treat Guaidó as its primary interlocutor — even as governments in Europe and Latin America stopped recognizing him.

• After the vote, spokespeople for the White House and State Department declined to say directly whether the U.S. was dropping its recognition of Guaidó. Instead, they said the U.S. recognized the National Assembly elected in 2015, which Guaidó had led, as Venezuela's "only remaining democratically elected institution."
• However, the senior State Department official told Axios on Wednesday: "The 2015 National Assembly recognizes Guaidó as one of its members, not as Interim President, as the Interim Government no longer exists. So we’re following their lead."
• "The National Assembly is currently in the midst of making internal decisions regarding its own leadership, so we’re going to wait and see how that plays out," the official said.
• The U.S. will continue to communicate with Guaidó and other "likeminded" members of the opposition, the official added.

Guaidó's presidency became a "self-perpetuating thesis," said Phil Gunson, an International Crisis Group analyst in Caracas.

• His mission to quickly replace Maduro had failed, he'd lost public confidence, and he lacked the support of three of the four major opposition factions — but his international backing and control of some government assets seemed to make him immovable, Gunson told Axios.

• Finally, though, opposition lawmakers decided to "chop off the afflicted limb" and accept the "painful" consequences, Gunson said, adding that it remains to be seen whether the dissolution of the interim government will have any bearing on court cases regarding gold reserves held in the U.K. or control of oil refiner Citgo.

The National Assembly, which convenes over Zoom because much of the opposition is now in exile, is expected to select its new leadership this week.

• While Guaidó derived his claim to the presidency on the assembly leader's place in the presidential line of succession, that model has now been scrapped.
• The opposition remains divided and appears unlikely to rally around one single figure in the near term. There may be no clear opposition leader until candidates are selected for the presidential elections planned for 2024.