Editor's note: On paper the two systems, the Russian and the American, are similar. But in reality, the Soviet-era Smerch is a "grid eraser" that disperses its missiles and showers an entire area with ordnance (which is what you want for certain things), whereas the American missile is a precision weapon.

They operate at the same ranges, but Smerch (it's like Grad but much longer range) is artillery (just extremely long-range) whereas HIMARS is a Liliputan tactical ballistic missile. One way to think about HIMARS is as a poor man's Iskander.

It performs the same role that the Russians would use their precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles for. But its range is far more limited and the warhead isn't particularly powerful either. On the other hand, the missiles are cheaper.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainians have already expended a significant portion of the US stock of HIMARS missiles, and ammo availability is starting to be a limiting factor for them.

The Russians do have a relatively new system called Tornado-S that is similar to HIMARS, but its GLONASS sattelite guidance isn't quite on par with the American GPS, plus it only exists in small numbers so far.

---

Source: Voennoe Obozrenie

Machine translated from Russian.

Over the past months, a variety of opinions have been voiced about the HIMARS system. But no one paid attention to the main thing.

The use of HIMARS differs from other multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS)

Let's start with such an example.

The estimated deflection of the Smerch shells at a range of 70 km does not exceed 150 m. This is not enough to hit point targets. But more than enough to provide a "controlled dispersion" of shells in a salvo. The Smerch shells must not fall into the same funnel. They should fall at some calculated distance from each other. In order for a full salvo from 12 guides to leave behind 672,000 sq. m of scorched space!

MLRS HIMARS, on the contrary, tends to heap "put" shells at one point. The projectile separation capability (estimated at 1-2 km at maximum firing distance) was provided for attacking several individual targets located in a narrow sector. In practice, such a coincidence is rare, so HIMARS fire volleys at the same target.

Pointing each missile at a specific target is contrary to the intent behind the MLRS installations. Their application does not require the calculation of coordinates for each individual target. Volley launch of many shells is guaranteed to cause damage to enemy forces dispersed over a large area.

This is the whole meaning and advantage of this type of weapon . The measure of success is fire performance. The blast wave weakens to the third power of distance. When shooting at areas, many explosions of lower power are always more effective than single explosions of high power.

The instructions of the Soviet period indicated that a salvo of three Smerch MLRS installations was comparable in efficiency to the work of two brigades armed with 9K79 Tochka-U missile systems. That is, one and a half to two dozen missiles fired, equipped with half-ton warheads!

Unlike the Smerchs, Grads and Hurricanes, the Hymars is deprived of the main quality of the MLRS - high fire performance. Instead, it provides a circular probable deviation of each ammunition within a dozen meters.

Sniping from MLRS is nonsense. This means that HIMARS belongs to a different type of weapon. The characteristics and purpose of HIMARS correspond to the complex of tactical surface-to-surface missiles. The impression is reinforced by the too small number of guides for the MLRS.

Are traces of MLRS still present in his pedigree? From its ancestors, the Chimera inherited only the ability to fire in a salvo, however, only six missiles.

This betrays the main weakness of the prodigy

Why fire missiles repeatedly at the same place?

HIMARS takes on the tasks of tactical (operational-tactical) missile systems using rockets with 90-kg warheads. For comparison, the missiles of the Tochka-U complex are equipped with high-explosive fragmentation warheads weighing 482 kg, containing over 160 kg of explosives!

The lack of power of HIMARS ammunition became especially noticeable from the results of their combat tour in Ukraine. The missiles turned out to be ineffective in solving the tasks of a strategic scale, which the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been putting before them for the second month already.

Perhaps the reason lies in the ridiculous attempts to use the complex beyond its capabilities. Disabling kilometer bridges was hardly taken into account when developing 227-mm GMLRS rockets.

To destroy capital structures, the MGM-140 ATACMS short-range ballistic missile was included in the HIMARS complex. The same “long arm of Hymars” with a launch range of 300 km, which so far no one is in a hurry to transfer to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The hull diameter is 610 mm with a launch weight of over one and a half tons. A 500-pound (230-kg) warhead is used as standard equipment.

In terms of its weight and dimensions, ATACMS approaches those of Tochka-U, and in terms of combat qualities (range and especially accuracy) it is expectedly superior. Still, 30 years of age difference.

The transport and launch container with the ATACMS missile has six decorative "guides" - outwardly it is difficult to distinguish from containers with GMLRS rockets that hit 70 km.

As of mid-September, there is no reliable evidence of the use of ATACMS in Ukraine.

In all other cases, this weapon, of course, deserves serious ratings.

Behind the swirling dust of tank biathlons, few people noticed that the “probable enemy” had a new method of warfare. Massed launches of guided missiles - at logistics hubs and "decision centers" in the near rear, to a depth of up to 70 km.

The Yankees guessed to create a complex of tactical missiles based on 227-mm shells of the former MLRS. This approach ensured relative mass character and the possibility of firing at targets that did not deserve the use of Tomahawks.

Unlike traditional multiple rocket launchers, in this case, only six guides were enough. And HIMARS itself fit on the chassis of a three-axle army truck.

This was followed by all the known qualities of HIMARS, which are drawn to so much attention. Stealth, mobility ...

There is only one reason - "HIMARS" is not an analogue of traditional MLRS.

On the technical side, the Hymars launcher is the "half" of the M270 installation. Multiple launch rocket system of the 1970s, built on the tracked chassis of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. With its own advantages and disadvantages. And a dozen guides for 227 mm shells - a close analogue of our "Hurricane".

In other words, the Hymars, like its predecessor, is capable of launching volleys of unguided rockets at targets at a distance of 30 km.

Was capable. And only in theory. With all the will, a competitor of the Grad MLRS will not come out of Hymars. It has a different purpose.

30 km is a very weak indicator for such a caliber. The Yankees have long abandoned the topic, never knowing what long-range unguided rockets are for.

The obsolete M26 shells were officially withdrawn from service in 2018. From that moment on, all M270s switched to tasks similar to the Hymars. With the advantage of better cross-country ability and density of a rocket salvo. And disadvantages in the form of a large mass and worse transportability.

In other words, across the ocean they completely abandoned the idea of ​​shooting at squares. How justified or premature this decision was will be shown by the coming conflicts. Decommissioned unguided shells were delivered in large numbers to ... You guessed where.

How to find a needle in a haystack?

For the use of high-precision missiles, in the quantities that HIMARS allows, not only the missiles themselves are needed, but also effective means of issuing target designation. In Ukraine, HIMARS operate on an area of ​​one hundred thousand square kilometers. "Bayraktars" and quadrocopters will not help here.

Who provides the APU with so much data? Global Hawk drones do not hang over the front line around the clock and Blackbirds do not fly.

Many experts agree that the APU was able to use the Hymars so actively due to access to services that provide high-resolution satellite imagery. And daily data updates. Such as the commercial company Maxar, which has its own constellation of satellites and tools for data analysis.

Analyzing and processing hundreds of images allows you to track the movement of convoys, identify regular stopping places and even daily routes of individual trucks. Based on these observations, conclusions are drawn about the location of military equipment accumulations, warehouses and command posts of the RF Armed Forces.

If this turns out to be true, then our military strategists, apparently, "slapped their ears" on the next round in the development of modern weapons.

There is no intrigue left in this topic, so in the end - a blitz on the most interesting issues.

Does Hymars charge itself?

Back at the end of July, at a briefing by the Ministry of Defense, an account was opened for the destroyed HIMARS installations.

“Two launchers were eliminated near the settlement of Malotaranovka, another HIMARS and a transport-loading vehicle near Krasnoarmeysk, and a fourth launcher on the eastern outskirts of Konstantinovka of the Donetsk People’s Republic.”
(Briefing July 22)

What attracted the attention of experts? Unlike Gradov, Smerch and Hurricanes, which require special equipment to install rockets on rails, there are no transport-loading vehicles in the HIMARS complex.

HIMARS continues the tradition of its predecessor M270 and uses interchangeable transport and launch containers. The TPK is being changed ... The process of changing ammunition can be seen in a short video.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnUk4n7BElE

What to do with the statement about the destruction of the "transport-loading vehicle"? It has its own explanation. Ammunition "Haymars" is not transported on conventional trucks.

Ammunition carriers are attached to each HIMARS battery - according to the state, two vehicles per launcher. These are ordinary 6x6 trucks, which are distinguished by the presence of a crane-manipulator and "shoes" for missile containers.

This technique bears the designation MK.37 Resupply Vehicle (literally - "resupply vehicle"). Her task is to lift and put the container on the ground in front of the launcher; further "Hymars" will do everything himself.

Probably, a machine of this type was discussed at the MoD briefing. No emphasis on technical details.

Hunt for the HIMARS

Installations with tactical missiles for the second month are dissected through the combat zone under the fire of Russian artillery and airborne forces. It is expected that among them there should be losses.

The question here is not in scoring, 5:3. The main question is why part of the "Chimera" is still on the move and shoots in all directions. As if not a couple of dozen, but hundreds and thousands of launchers were brought to Ukraine.

The enemy, of course, cares about the reputation of the "wunderwaffe" and will hide any data on losses.

From our side, the identification of the destroyed HIMARS is complicated by their external resemblance to trucks of the FMTV family. Dozens of such vehicles are used as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for towing 777 howitzers.

Another circumstance preventing the public demonstration of the wreckage is the way the HIMARS are used in combat. Installations "work" from the depths of enemy territory. Unlike the hulking 777 howitzers, the Ukrainian MLRS are not so easy to capture and display at the exhibition of captured weapons.

Domestic sources also do not strive for high-quality coverage of the events of the “hunt for Hymars”. The presented footage of the destruction of HIMARS launchers is of such low quality and resolution that they could describe any event in any military conflict.

However, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The Hymars had spent enough time in the war zone for casualties to form among them.

Russian analogue of HIMARS

An analogue of GMLRS rockets are 9M542 precision-guided munitions, designed for advanced MLRS 9K515 Tornado-S. The letter "S" indicates that the complex took the best from its progenitor - the Smerch MLRS.

The mass and caliber of the projectile are cubically related, for this reason, the 300-mm Tornado-S rockets have twice the power compared to the 227-mm GMLRS.

12 guides - instead of six for HIMARS. Due to its size and the use of a specific chassis, the Tornado-S is inferior in stealth and mobility. But it significantly surpasses HIMARS in terms of the power of ammunition, the firing range (120 km) and the density of the rocket salvo.

At the same time, the Russian complex retained the potential of the MLRS and the possibility of salvo firing of unguided rockets at targets dispersed over a large area.

The most important point is related to the issuance of target designation. As the events of the NMD demonstrate, control over the situation and movements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine leaves much to be desired.

And, as usual, the traditional question relates to the number of Tornado-S in service. 20 units are enough for parity with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but this is unacceptably low for a conflict with NATO countries.

As for ATACMS ballistic missiles, the advantage in this class of weapons remains with Russia. A complex that does not need a long introduction is the Iskander OTRK.

The world's first HIMARS operator in terms of the number of installations promises to be... Poland. In June of this year, the Polish Ministry of Defense announced plans to acquire 500 launchers (more than the US has in service) to equip 80 missile batteries with them. The absurdity of the situation is that four full salvos of HIMARS are more expensive than the launcher itself. The Poles, apparently, forgot to count the ammunition load for 500 launchers.

Editor's note: On paper the two systems, the Russian and the American, are similar. But in reality, the Soviet-era Smerch is a "grid eraser" that disperses its missiles and showers an entire area with ordnance (which is what you want for certain things), whereas the American missile is a precision weapon.

They operate at the same ranges, but Smerch (it's like Grad but much longer range) is artillery (just extremely long-range) whereas HIMARS is a Liliputan tactical ballistic missile. One way to think about HIMARS is as a poor man's Iskander.

It performs the same role that the Russians would use their precision-guided ballistic and cruise missiles for. But its range is far more limited and the warhead isn't particularly powerful either. On the other hand, the missiles are cheaper.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainians have already expended a significant portion of the US stock of HIMARS missiles, and ammo availability is starting to be a limiting factor for them.

The Russians do have a relatively new system called Tornado-S that is similar to HIMARS, but its GLONASS sattelite guidance isn't quite on par with the American GPS, plus it only exists in small numbers so far.

---

Source: Voennoe Obozrenie

Machine translated from Russian.

Over the past months, a variety of opinions have been voiced about the HIMARS system. But no one paid attention to the main thing.

The use of HIMARS differs from other multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS)

Let's start with such an example.

The estimated deflection of the Smerch shells at a range of 70 km does not exceed 150 m. This is not enough to hit point targets. But more than enough to provide a "controlled dispersion" of shells in a salvo. The Smerch shells must not fall into the same funnel. They should fall at some calculated distance from each other. In order for a full salvo from 12 guides to leave behind 672,000 sq. m of scorched space!

MLRS HIMARS, on the contrary, tends to heap "put" shells at one point. The projectile separation capability (estimated at 1-2 km at maximum firing distance) was provided for attacking several individual targets located in a narrow sector. In practice, such a coincidence is rare, so HIMARS fire volleys at the same target.

Pointing each missile at a specific target is contrary to the intent behind the MLRS installations. Their application does not require the calculation of coordinates for each individual target. Volley launch of many shells is guaranteed to cause damage to enemy forces dispersed over a large area.

This is the whole meaning and advantage of this type of weapon . The measure of success is fire performance. The blast wave weakens to the third power of distance. When shooting at areas, many explosions of lower power are always more effective than single explosions of high power.

The instructions of the Soviet period indicated that a salvo of three Smerch MLRS installations was comparable in efficiency to the work of two brigades armed with 9K79 Tochka-U missile systems. That is, one and a half to two dozen missiles fired, equipped with half-ton warheads!

Unlike the Smerchs, Grads and Hurricanes, the Hymars is deprived of the main quality of the MLRS - high fire performance. Instead, it provides a circular probable deviation of each ammunition within a dozen meters.

Sniping from MLRS is nonsense. This means that HIMARS belongs to a different type of weapon. The characteristics and purpose of HIMARS correspond to the complex of tactical surface-to-surface missiles. The impression is reinforced by the too small number of guides for the MLRS.

Are traces of MLRS still present in his pedigree? From its ancestors, the Chimera inherited only the ability to fire in a salvo, however, only six missiles.

This betrays the main weakness of the prodigy

Why fire missiles repeatedly at the same place?

HIMARS takes on the tasks of tactical (operational-tactical) missile systems using rockets with 90-kg warheads. For comparison, the missiles of the Tochka-U complex are equipped with high-explosive fragmentation warheads weighing 482 kg, containing over 160 kg of explosives!

The lack of power of HIMARS ammunition became especially noticeable from the results of their combat tour in Ukraine. The missiles turned out to be ineffective in solving the tasks of a strategic scale, which the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine has been putting before them for the second month already.

Perhaps the reason lies in the ridiculous attempts to use the complex beyond its capabilities. Disabling kilometer bridges was hardly taken into account when developing 227-mm GMLRS rockets.

To destroy capital structures, the MGM-140 ATACMS short-range ballistic missile was included in the HIMARS complex. The same “long arm of Hymars” with a launch range of 300 km, which so far no one is in a hurry to transfer to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

The hull diameter is 610 mm with a launch weight of over one and a half tons. A 500-pound (230-kg) warhead is used as standard equipment.

In terms of its weight and dimensions, ATACMS approaches those of Tochka-U, and in terms of combat qualities (range and especially accuracy) it is expectedly superior. Still, 30 years of age difference.

The transport and launch container with the ATACMS missile has six decorative "guides" - outwardly it is difficult to distinguish from containers with GMLRS rockets that hit 70 km.

As of mid-September, there is no reliable evidence of the use of ATACMS in Ukraine.

In all other cases, this weapon, of course, deserves serious ratings.

Behind the swirling dust of tank biathlons, few people noticed that the “probable enemy” had a new method of warfare. Massed launches of guided missiles - at logistics hubs and "decision centers" in the near rear, to a depth of up to 70 km.

The Yankees guessed to create a complex of tactical missiles based on 227-mm shells of the former MLRS. This approach ensured relative mass character and the possibility of firing at targets that did not deserve the use of Tomahawks.

Unlike traditional multiple rocket launchers, in this case, only six guides were enough. And HIMARS itself fit on the chassis of a three-axle army truck.

This was followed by all the known qualities of HIMARS, which are drawn to so much attention. Stealth, mobility ...

There is only one reason - "HIMARS" is not an analogue of traditional MLRS.

On the technical side, the Hymars launcher is the "half" of the M270 installation. Multiple launch rocket system of the 1970s, built on the tracked chassis of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle. With its own advantages and disadvantages. And a dozen guides for 227 mm shells - a close analogue of our "Hurricane".

In other words, the Hymars, like its predecessor, is capable of launching volleys of unguided rockets at targets at a distance of 30 km.

Was capable. And only in theory. With all the will, a competitor of the Grad MLRS will not come out of Hymars. It has a different purpose.

30 km is a very weak indicator for such a caliber. The Yankees have long abandoned the topic, never knowing what long-range unguided rockets are for.

The obsolete M26 shells were officially withdrawn from service in 2018. From that moment on, all M270s switched to tasks similar to the Hymars. With the advantage of better cross-country ability and density of a rocket salvo. And disadvantages in the form of a large mass and worse transportability.

In other words, across the ocean they completely abandoned the idea of ​​shooting at squares. How justified or premature this decision was will be shown by the coming conflicts. Decommissioned unguided shells were delivered in large numbers to ... You guessed where.

How to find a needle in a haystack?

For the use of high-precision missiles, in the quantities that HIMARS allows, not only the missiles themselves are needed, but also effective means of issuing target designation. In Ukraine, HIMARS operate on an area of ​​one hundred thousand square kilometers. "Bayraktars" and quadrocopters will not help here.

Who provides the APU with so much data? Global Hawk drones do not hang over the front line around the clock and Blackbirds do not fly.

Many experts agree that the APU was able to use the Hymars so actively due to access to services that provide high-resolution satellite imagery. And daily data updates. Such as the commercial company Maxar, which has its own constellation of satellites and tools for data analysis.

Analyzing and processing hundreds of images allows you to track the movement of convoys, identify regular stopping places and even daily routes of individual trucks. Based on these observations, conclusions are drawn about the location of military equipment accumulations, warehouses and command posts of the RF Armed Forces.

If this turns out to be true, then our military strategists, apparently, "slapped their ears" on the next round in the development of modern weapons.

There is no intrigue left in this topic, so in the end - a blitz on the most interesting issues.

Does Hymars charge itself?

Back at the end of July, at a briefing by the Ministry of Defense, an account was opened for the destroyed HIMARS installations.

“Two launchers were eliminated near the settlement of Malotaranovka, another HIMARS and a transport-loading vehicle near Krasnoarmeysk, and a fourth launcher on the eastern outskirts of Konstantinovka of the Donetsk People’s Republic.”
(Briefing July 22)

What attracted the attention of experts? Unlike Gradov, Smerch and Hurricanes, which require special equipment to install rockets on rails, there are no transport-loading vehicles in the HIMARS complex.

HIMARS continues the tradition of its predecessor M270 and uses interchangeable transport and launch containers. The TPK is being changed ... The process of changing ammunition can be seen in a short video.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnUk4n7BElE

What to do with the statement about the destruction of the "transport-loading vehicle"? It has its own explanation. Ammunition "Haymars" is not transported on conventional trucks.

Ammunition carriers are attached to each HIMARS battery - according to the state, two vehicles per launcher. These are ordinary 6x6 trucks, which are distinguished by the presence of a crane-manipulator and "shoes" for missile containers.

This technique bears the designation MK.37 Resupply Vehicle (literally - "resupply vehicle"). Her task is to lift and put the container on the ground in front of the launcher; further "Hymars" will do everything himself.

Probably, a machine of this type was discussed at the MoD briefing. No emphasis on technical details.

Hunt for the HIMARS

Installations with tactical missiles for the second month are dissected through the combat zone under the fire of Russian artillery and airborne forces. It is expected that among them there should be losses.

The question here is not in scoring, 5:3. The main question is why part of the "Chimera" is still on the move and shoots in all directions. As if not a couple of dozen, but hundreds and thousands of launchers were brought to Ukraine.

The enemy, of course, cares about the reputation of the "wunderwaffe" and will hide any data on losses.

From our side, the identification of the destroyed HIMARS is complicated by their external resemblance to trucks of the FMTV family. Dozens of such vehicles are used as part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for towing 777 howitzers.

Another circumstance preventing the public demonstration of the wreckage is the way the HIMARS are used in combat. Installations "work" from the depths of enemy territory. Unlike the hulking 777 howitzers, the Ukrainian MLRS are not so easy to capture and display at the exhibition of captured weapons.

Domestic sources also do not strive for high-quality coverage of the events of the “hunt for Hymars”. The presented footage of the destruction of HIMARS launchers is of such low quality and resolution that they could describe any event in any military conflict.

However, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The Hymars had spent enough time in the war zone for casualties to form among them.

Russian analogue of HIMARS

An analogue of GMLRS rockets are 9M542 precision-guided munitions, designed for advanced MLRS 9K515 Tornado-S. The letter "S" indicates that the complex took the best from its progenitor - the Smerch MLRS.

The mass and caliber of the projectile are cubically related, for this reason, the 300-mm Tornado-S rockets have twice the power compared to the 227-mm GMLRS.

12 guides - instead of six for HIMARS. Due to its size and the use of a specific chassis, the Tornado-S is inferior in stealth and mobility. But it significantly surpasses HIMARS in terms of the power of ammunition, the firing range (120 km) and the density of the rocket salvo.

At the same time, the Russian complex retained the potential of the MLRS and the possibility of salvo firing of unguided rockets at targets dispersed over a large area.

The most important point is related to the issuance of target designation. As the events of the NMD demonstrate, control over the situation and movements of the Armed Forces of Ukraine leaves much to be desired.

And, as usual, the traditional question relates to the number of Tornado-S in service. 20 units are enough for parity with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, but this is unacceptably low for a conflict with NATO countries.

As for ATACMS ballistic missiles, the advantage in this class of weapons remains with Russia. A complex that does not need a long introduction is the Iskander OTRK.

The world's first HIMARS operator in terms of the number of installations promises to be... Poland. In June of this year, the Polish Ministry of Defense announced plans to acquire 500 launchers (more than the US has in service) to equip 80 missile batteries with them. The absurdity of the situation is that four full salvos of HIMARS are more expensive than the launcher itself. The Poles, apparently, forgot to count the ammunition load for 500 launchers.

This Tuesday referendums on joining Russia were announced for Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporozhye. Four days of voting from the 23rd through 27th are foreseen.

Referendums in wartime (under shells), for regions Russia doesn’t even fully control, with announcements made just 3 days ahead. — It’s safe to say it’s not a great look.

The most comical situation is the one in Zaporozhye. Russia doesn’t even hold Zaporozhye city that is home to 0.8 million of the region’s 1.6 million inhabitants. Russia controls under 50% of the region’s inhabitants but is organizing a “referendum” to transfer the region from Kiev to Moscow.

They’re not low-IQ in Moscow. If we can see that this isn’t a good look, then so can they.

In fact, it’s such a bad look that Moscow has spent 7 months trying to avoid it. The original intent was to first extend control over the entirety of Donetsk and Lugansk, and only then have the rubber-stamp referenda, as would have made far more sense.*

Yet they’re going ahead now, all of a sudden, and at a break-neck pace (just three days from announcement to voting). Why is that?

The reason is that it came down to either start doing things with the proper intensity, or slowly lose the war. The reason is that the Kremlin could no longer maintain the illusion (particularly to itself) that the war was on a proper track.

The war in the parameters before September 20th had exhausted itself, was on the back foot, and was probably headed for a defeat in the long-run, but was certainly headed for the destruction of Russia’s professional Ground Army — not so much on the battlefield, but through a combination of problems with burnout, retention and recruitment.

Far from the assertions of the 5D Kremlin Fan Club Boys that the shock success of Ukraine’s Kharkov offensive “did not matter”, the conclusion in the Kremlin was the precise opposite. Unlike its fanboys, the Kremlin opted to treat the Ukrainian offensive as a massive wake-up call, and reason to do what it had been desperately resisting for 7 months.

It was certainly a wake-up call for any pro-Russians in the territories Moscow had captured since February 24th. Moscow waltzed into Kharkov in February-March, started putting up “Russian World, One People” billboards, handing out citizenships, and promising it was here forever, then ran away in a matter of just 5 days. This after they had made “We do not leave ours behind” the official motto of the SMO.

After this who would ever be dumb enough to stick out his neck for Russia again?

After the Kharkov debacle the pro-Russians needed assurances that Kremlins are actually serious and not a bunch of feckless traitors to the Russkiy Mir as it was starting to look. The annexation to Russia that will follow the referenda is that badly needed assurance.

Another thing annexations will do is make conscripts deployable.

Officially Russia insists that conscripts will still not be deployed to “the area of SMO”. But just a week ago Peskov was also still insisting that there would be no mobilization either. Thus all Kremlin utterances must be treated as being of the “here today, gone tomorrow” variety.

The fact is that proclaiming the four regions Russian soil makes conscripts immediately deployable to them, without even having to proclaim a state of war.

Moreover the mobilization decree allows the state to mobilize conscripts as soon as they are discharged and become “former servicemen”, so it would be rather illogical if you could not be deployed while still in uniform but would become deployable immediately upon discharge.

(Possibly the assurances that conscripts will not be deployed are maintained for now so as not to make the fall draft any harder than it needs to be.)

Anyway, up until now the Russkiy Mir pitch Moscow has had been a very unappealing one. Not because there aren’t willing takers in principle — there are. But because Kremlin-s half-heartedness made it a two-tier system where pro-Russians outside Russia’s borders got a rotten deal.

The members of this Russkiy Mir in Kharkov, Kherson and Zaporozhye had no real security guarantees, which is why the pro-Russians of Kharkov are now refugees. Those in DLPR had security guarantees but they were also made to bear disproportionate sacrifices to repay them.

While trained conscripts already in the military from Crimea and Moscow were not sent to war, DLPR was made to carry out a general mobilization and send untrained 50-somethings off to war.

Perhaps these referendums (as sketchy as they are) can start to make Russkiy Mir a more egalitarian and just system, not one where your security and rights depend on your usefulness to the electoral prospects of the shysters of United Russia.

https://twitter.com/LvivTyler/status/1572195862113316864

https://twitter.com/paolobucci68/status/1572944324899348481

https://twitter.com/sbobkov/status/1573102815643598848

This Tuesday referendums on joining Russia were announced for Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporozhye. Four days of voting from the 23rd through 27th are foreseen.

Referendums in wartime (under shells), for regions Russia doesn’t even fully control, with announcements made just 3 days ahead. — It’s safe to say it’s not a great look.

The most comical situation is the one in Zaporozhye. Russia doesn’t even hold Zaporozhye city that is home to 0.8 million of the region’s 1.6 million inhabitants. Russia controls under 50% of the region’s inhabitants but is organizing a “referendum” to transfer the region from Kiev to Moscow.

They’re not low-IQ in Moscow. If we can see that this isn’t a good look, then so can they.

In fact, it’s such a bad look that Moscow has spent 7 months trying to avoid it. The original intent was to first extend control over the entirety of Donetsk and Lugansk, and only then have the rubber-stamp referenda, as would have made far more sense.*

Yet they’re going ahead now, all of a sudden, and at a break-neck pace (just three days from announcement to voting). Why is that?

The reason is that it came down to either start doing things with the proper intensity, or slowly lose the war. The reason is that the Kremlin could no longer maintain the illusion (particularly to itself) that the war was on a proper track.

The war in the parameters before September 20th had exhausted itself, was on the back foot, and was probably headed for a defeat in the long-run, but was certainly headed for the destruction of Russia’s professional Ground Army — not so much on the battlefield, but through a combination of problems with burnout, retention and recruitment.

Far from the assertions of the 5D Kremlin Fan Club Boys that the shock success of Ukraine’s Kharkov offensive “did not matter”, the conclusion in the Kremlin was the precise opposite. Unlike its fanboys, the Kremlin opted to treat the Ukrainian offensive as a massive wake-up call, and reason to do what it had been desperately resisting for 7 months.

It was certainly a wake-up call for any pro-Russians in the territories Moscow had captured since February 24th. Moscow waltzed into Kharkov in February-March, started putting up “Russian World, One People” billboards, handing out citizenships, and promising it was here forever, then ran away in a matter of just 5 days. This after they had made “We do not leave ours behind” the official motto of the SMO.

After this who would ever be dumb enough to stick out his neck for Russia again?

After the Kharkov debacle the pro-Russians needed assurances that Kremlins are actually serious and not a bunch of feckless traitors to the Russkiy Mir as it was starting to look. The annexation to Russia that will follow the referenda is that badly needed assurance.

Another thing annexations will do is make conscripts deployable.

Officially Russia insists that conscripts will still not be deployed to “the area of SMO”. But just a week ago Peskov was also still insisting that there would be no mobilization either. Thus all Kremlin utterances must be treated as being of the “here today, gone tomorrow” variety.

The fact is that proclaiming the four regions Russian soil makes conscripts immediately deployable to them, without even having to proclaim a state of war.

Moreover the mobilization decree allows the state to mobilize conscripts as soon as they are discharged and become “former servicemen”, so it would be rather illogical if you could not be deployed while still in uniform but would become deployable immediately upon discharge.

(Possibly the assurances that conscripts will not be deployed are maintained for now so as not to make the fall draft any harder than it needs to be.)

Anyway, up until now the Russkiy Mir pitch Moscow has had been a very unappealing one. Not because there aren’t willing takers in principle — there are. But because Kremlin-s half-heartedness made it a two-tier system where pro-Russians outside Russia’s borders got a rotten deal.

The members of this Russkiy Mir in Kharkov, Kherson and Zaporozhye had no real security guarantees, which is why the pro-Russians of Kharkov are now refugees. Those in DLPR had security guarantees but they were also made to bear disproportionate sacrifices to repay them.

While trained conscripts already in the military from Crimea and Moscow were not sent to war, DLPR was made to carry out a general mobilization and send untrained 50-somethings off to war.

Perhaps these referendums (as sketchy as they are) can start to make Russkiy Mir a more egalitarian and just system, not one where your security and rights depend on your usefulness to the electoral prospects of the shysters of United Russia.

https://twitter.com/LvivTyler/status/1572195862113316864

https://twitter.com/paolobucci68/status/1572944324899348481

https://twitter.com/sbobkov/status/1573102815643598848

At Kherson a grind continues with the Ukrainians still hoping they can gradually weaken and expose Russian positions in a phased setpiece battle.

At Bakhmut Wagner in its private war has edged a little closer to the town.

Around the confluence of Oskil and Seversky Donetsk (near Izyum) the Ukrainians have crossed the river and captured the villages of Sviatohirsk and Yarova.

At Kupyansk Russian reporters on the ground say that Russian forces are still in eastern half of the city across the Oskil, but they have only been able to provide footage from the nearby village of Kislovka as they report that from there on Ukrainian artillery is too dangerous.

Ukrainians meanwhile have been able to supply footage of strolling across the Oskil bridge in Kupyansk, and of a part of eastern Kupyansk. It seems certain that the Ukrainians carried out at least a temporary incursion into left-bank Kupyansk, and even pro-Russian mappers are drawing the situation in that town as the bridge being in Ukrainian possession along with a thin strip beyond it.

The Ukrainians have also crossed the Seversky Donetsk near Slovyansk and are threatening Liman.

Finally, the Ukrainians have taken, or at the very least entered, the settlement of Belogorovka not far from Lisichansk.

Belogorovka and Lisichansk were located near the exposed tip of the Ukrainian salient that the Russians spent entire late spring and summer collapsing. Moreover Belogorovka is in Lugansk oblast.

In summary then, the Ukrainians hold 2, possibly 3 bridgeheads across the Oskil-Seversky Donetsk system. At Lyman, at Sviatohirsk, and possibly at Kupyansk. (In the recent Ukrainian offensive Russia fled behind the Oskil but now even these river-aided positions aren’t holding up everywhere.)

The Russians also no longer hold 100% of Lugansk oblast.

Who could have thought that after 208 days of fighting the Russians would hold neither the whole of Donetsk nor Lugansk?

Shocking stuff, but that’s not even the key Russian problem. The truth is that even if Putin held the whole of DLPR his position would be no better.

If Putin held the whole of DLPR he could declare that his minimal goals had been accomplished and that he was now ready for a ceasefire. But why should the Ukrainians accept an end to hostilities?

In a war, it is not enough to take physical possession of your objective (which the Russians have failed to do), one must also force the other side to accept the new status quo.

In an overwhelming victory that is done by conquering the opposing political system, or shattering the opposing military. Failing that the war must at least demonstrate to the other side the futility of trying to recapture what has been lost.

The Russians have done anything but.

After just 7 months of expedited Ukrainian army-building, the Russians find themselves outnumbered and on the defensive, and even ceding ground in places. What the Ukrainians will be thinking is “if we accomplished this much in 7 months, how much more can we do in another 7 or 14?”

The Russian conscript-less invasion neither collapsed the Ukrainian state, nor isolated it from its major sources of manpower (cities). Owing to aggression, surprise, and an edge in technology and professionalism it was initially dominant over the opposition. But that wasn’t leveraged in a way to cripple Kiev’s ability to prosecute the war past the initial stage in any game-changing way. For example, except for Mariupol neither Ukrainian cities nor forces in the south and east were encircled.

(For a conscript-less invasion even a conventional military plan that sought southeastern encirclements to prevent Kiev from being able to dip into the manpower of Kharkov, Dnipro, Zaporozhye, etc would have been very difficult already. Instead, an even more ambitious plan to drive over 300 kilometers to Kiev was conceived, wasting the military’s elan on the pie-in-the-sky that was the daydream of instant regime change.)

I said in April that the outcome of the war is in Russia’s hands alone. Russia is massive enough and the US has taken enough of a backseat that this is true. It is only a question of Russian willpower. If Russia wants to win badly enough, nothing can stop her. But this is only true if deploying conscripts is on the table.

But if deploying conscripts is forever off the table — then it is rather the other way around. Then the outcome is in Ukraine’s hands alone and only a question of Ukrainian willpower.

If conscripts are off the table then Moscow will be extremely lucky just to get the Iraq-Iran War scenario. — A never-ending bloody stalemate where the better-equipped military precariously hangs against a larger force.

But this is the optimistic scenario for Moscow. In the less rosy scenario for Moscow Kiev will continue building up its army until one day it will be capable of successful offensives, not just against neglected Russian flanks, but even against its center.

Putin says that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. That would make Ukrainians his people. I think that he is sincere in this. I think that he is not numb to Russian deaths and I think that he is not numb to Ukrainian deaths. — And yet he escalated the dormant Donbass War into the much larger Ukraine War without a surefire way to the bloodshed.

He watched George Bush start wars without a surefire endgame, and then he went ahead and did the same himself. Except Bush at least started such wars with far-away foreigners. But Putin popped open a new open-ended slaughter where every death would be Russian.

 

PS.: Putin is expected to address the nation shortly. We’ll see if the address will be in some way connected to the deployment of conscripts.

At Kherson a grind continues with the Ukrainians still hoping they can gradually weaken and expose Russian positions in a phased setpiece battle.

At Bakhmut Wagner in its private war has edged a little closer to the town.

Around the confluence of Oskil and Seversky Donetsk (near Izyum) the Ukrainians have crossed the river and captured the villages of Sviatohirsk and Yarova.

At Kupyansk Russian reporters on the ground say that Russian forces are still in eastern half of the city across the Oskil, but they have only been able to provide footage from the nearby village of Kislovka as they report that from there on Ukrainian artillery is too dangerous.

Ukrainians meanwhile have been able to supply footage of strolling across the Oskil bridge in Kupyansk, and of a part of eastern Kupyansk. It seems certain that the Ukrainians carried out at least a temporary incursion into left-bank Kupyansk, and even pro-Russian mappers are drawing the situation in that town as the bridge being in Ukrainian possession along with a thin strip beyond it.

The Ukrainians have also crossed the Seversky Donetsk near Slovyansk and are threatening Liman.

Finally, the Ukrainians have taken, or at the very least entered, the settlement of Belogorovka not far from Lisichansk.

Belogorovka and Lisichansk were located near the exposed tip of the Ukrainian salient that the Russians spent entire late spring and summer collapsing. Moreover Belogorovka is in Lugansk oblast.

In summary then, the Ukrainians hold 2, possibly 3 bridgeheads across the Oskil-Seversky Donetsk system. At Lyman, at Sviatohirsk, and possibly at Kupyansk. (In the recent Ukrainian offensive Russia fled behind the Oskil but now even these river-aided positions aren’t holding up everywhere.)

The Russians also no longer hold 100% of Lugansk oblast.

Who could have thought that after 208 days of fighting the Russians would hold neither the whole of Donetsk nor Lugansk?

Shocking stuff, but that’s not even the key Russian problem. The truth is that even if Putin held the whole of DLPR his position would be no better.

If Putin held the whole of DLPR he could declare that his minimal goals had been accomplished and that he was now ready for a ceasefire. But why should the Ukrainians accept an end to hostilities?

In a war, it is not enough to take physical possession of your objective (which the Russians have failed to do), one must also force the other side to accept the new status quo.

In an overwhelming victory that is done by conquering the opposing political system, or shattering the opposing military. Failing that the war must at least demonstrate to the other side the futility of trying to recapture what has been lost.

The Russians have done anything but.

After just 7 months of expedited Ukrainian army-building, the Russians find themselves outnumbered and on the defensive, and even ceding ground in places. What the Ukrainians will be thinking is “if we accomplished this much in 7 months, how much more can we do in another 7 or 14?”

The Russian conscript-less invasion neither collapsed the Ukrainian state, nor isolated it from its major sources of manpower (cities). Owing to aggression, surprise, and an edge in technology and professionalism it was initially dominant over the opposition. But that wasn’t leveraged in a way to cripple Kiev’s ability to prosecute the war past the initial stage in any game-changing way. For example, except for Mariupol neither Ukrainian cities nor forces in the south and east were encircled.

(For a conscript-less invasion even a conventional military plan that sought southeastern encirclements to prevent Kiev from being able to dip into the manpower of Kharkov, Dnipro, Zaporozhye, etc would have been very difficult already. Instead, an even more ambitious plan to drive over 300 kilometers to Kiev was conceived, wasting the military’s elan on the pie-in-the-sky that was the daydream of instant regime change.)

I said in April that the outcome of the war is in Russia’s hands alone. Russia is massive enough and the US has taken enough of a backseat that this is true. It is only a question of Russian willpower. If Russia wants to win badly enough, nothing can stop her. But this is only true if deploying conscripts is on the table.

But if deploying conscripts is forever off the table — then it is rather the other way around. Then the outcome is in Ukraine’s hands alone and only a question of Ukrainian willpower.

If conscripts are off the table then Moscow will be extremely lucky just to get the Iraq-Iran War scenario. — A never-ending bloody stalemate where the better-equipped military precariously hangs against a larger force.

But this is the optimistic scenario for Moscow. In the less rosy scenario for Moscow Kiev will continue building up its army until one day it will be capable of successful offensives, not just against neglected Russian flanks, but even against its center.

Putin says that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. That would make Ukrainians his people. I think that he is sincere in this. I think that he is not numb to Russian deaths and I think that he is not numb to Ukrainian deaths. — And yet he escalated the dormant Donbass War into the much larger Ukraine War without a surefire way to the bloodshed.

He watched George Bush start wars without a surefire endgame, and then he went ahead and did the same himself. Except Bush at least started such wars with far-away foreigners. But Putin popped open a new open-ended slaughter where every death would be Russian.

 

PS.: Putin is expected to address the nation shortly. We’ll see if the address will be in some way connected to the deployment of conscripts.

Source: Financial Times

In May 2017, Rosneft chief executive Igor Sechin came to Berlin to outline a five-year plan to double the Russian oil company’s investments in German refining to €600mn.

Cut to 2022 and Rosneft’s assets have been taken over by the German government. Sechin’s dream of downstream expansion into Europe’s largest oil products market is in ruins, a victim of the escalating energy war between Russia and the west.

On Friday, the German government said it was seizing control of Rosneft’s stakes in three German refineries — PCK in Schwedt, north-east of Berlin, MiRo in Karlsruhe and Bayernoil in the Bavarian town of Vohburg.

The trigger for the takeover was the looming EU ban on imports of Russian oil, which comes into force on January 1 and could put massive pressure on Germany’s refining industry. Russia has already severed natural gas supplies to Germany threatening a deep recession in the country this winter.

Berlin has had some success in finding alternatives to Russian crude, but the Schwedt plant presented a problem: not only does it sit right on top of a Russian pipeline, the 4,000km-long “Druzhba” or friendship line, but it is also 54 per cent owned by Rosneft, a company with little interest in refining non-Russian oil at the site.

The government, which is placing the Rosneft stakes under the trusteeship of the federal energy regulator, the Bundesnetzagentur, said Russian ownership of Schwedt and the other two refineries jeopardised their business operations.

“Key, critical service providers such as suppliers, insurance companies, banks, IT companies, but also customers, were no longer prepared to work with [sanctioned] Rosneft,” the economy ministry said.

It is all a far cry from Sechin’s press conference in 2017, which marked the opening of Rosneft Deutschland’s new Berlin office. It was a time when German-Russian relations were on an even keel and the Kremlin was still seen by many in Germany as a reliable partner.

The optimists were personified by Michael Harms, head of the Ost-Ausschuss, the principal lobby for German investors in Russia. Appearing next to Sechin, one of President Vladimir Putin’s closest confidants, he said Rosneft’s new Berlin representation was “proof of Russia’s unwavering commitment to the European market”.

German-Russian trade had, he added, “risen dramatically” in the first two months of 2017, and the expectation was that “it will grow by 10 per cent this year, if not more”.

Sechin echoed his assessment. The volume of trade between Russia and Germany had risen fourfold between 2000 and 2013 to €56bn, with German imports from Russia tripling to €27bn and German exports to Russia rising sevenfold to €29bn. “And it’s not just oil deliveries and oil refining, but also technological co-operation,” he said, alluding to the massive market Russia had become for German manufacturers.

Bloomberg:

Rosneft said the move amounted to an expropriation of equity assets in which it had invested 4.6 billion euro ($4.6 billion) for refining capacity, according to a company statement late Friday.

CNBC:

The landlocked refinery is the source of 90% of Berlin’s fuel and has received all its crude from Russia via the Druzhba pipeline since the plant was built in the 1960s.

The refinery, brought under state control under Germany’s energy security law, can continue to operate but not at full capacity, a spokesperson for the economy ministry said on Friday.

Source: Financial Times

In May 2017, Rosneft chief executive Igor Sechin came to Berlin to outline a five-year plan to double the Russian oil company’s investments in German refining to €600mn.

Cut to 2022 and Rosneft’s assets have been taken over by the German government. Sechin’s dream of downstream expansion into Europe’s largest oil products market is in ruins, a victim of the escalating energy war between Russia and the west.

On Friday, the German government said it was seizing control of Rosneft’s stakes in three German refineries — PCK in Schwedt, north-east of Berlin, MiRo in Karlsruhe and Bayernoil in the Bavarian town of Vohburg.

The trigger for the takeover was the looming EU ban on imports of Russian oil, which comes into force on January 1 and could put massive pressure on Germany’s refining industry. Russia has already severed natural gas supplies to Germany threatening a deep recession in the country this winter.

Berlin has had some success in finding alternatives to Russian crude, but the Schwedt plant presented a problem: not only does it sit right on top of a Russian pipeline, the 4,000km-long “Druzhba” or friendship line, but it is also 54 per cent owned by Rosneft, a company with little interest in refining non-Russian oil at the site.

The government, which is placing the Rosneft stakes under the trusteeship of the federal energy regulator, the Bundesnetzagentur, said Russian ownership of Schwedt and the other two refineries jeopardised their business operations.

“Key, critical service providers such as suppliers, insurance companies, banks, IT companies, but also customers, were no longer prepared to work with [sanctioned] Rosneft,” the economy ministry said.

It is all a far cry from Sechin’s press conference in 2017, which marked the opening of Rosneft Deutschland’s new Berlin office. It was a time when German-Russian relations were on an even keel and the Kremlin was still seen by many in Germany as a reliable partner.

The optimists were personified by Michael Harms, head of the Ost-Ausschuss, the principal lobby for German investors in Russia. Appearing next to Sechin, one of President Vladimir Putin’s closest confidants, he said Rosneft’s new Berlin representation was “proof of Russia’s unwavering commitment to the European market”.

German-Russian trade had, he added, “risen dramatically” in the first two months of 2017, and the expectation was that “it will grow by 10 per cent this year, if not more”.

Sechin echoed his assessment. The volume of trade between Russia and Germany had risen fourfold between 2000 and 2013 to €56bn, with German imports from Russia tripling to €27bn and German exports to Russia rising sevenfold to €29bn. “And it’s not just oil deliveries and oil refining, but also technological co-operation,” he said, alluding to the massive market Russia had become for German manufacturers.

Bloomberg:

Rosneft said the move amounted to an expropriation of equity assets in which it had invested 4.6 billion euro ($4.6 billion) for refining capacity, according to a company statement late Friday.

CNBC:

The landlocked refinery is the source of 90% of Berlin’s fuel and has received all its crude from Russia via the Druzhba pipeline since the plant was built in the 1960s.

The refinery, brought under state control under Germany’s energy security law, can continue to operate but not at full capacity, a spokesperson for the economy ministry said on Friday.

This week it has become known that convicts in Russia are being released into Wagner mercenary company.

According to a Prigozhin recruitment speech in one of the penal colonies, prisoners are able to trade in their sentence for a 6-month stint with Wagner in the Ukraine.

After 6 months they receive an official pardon from the state.

Releasing prisoners into military service has a strong historic precedent in Russia. During World War 2 nearly one million gulag inmates were released into the Red Army.

Many started their service in shtraf or penal units. Inmates could exchange 3 to 5 years of their sentence for 1 month in a shtrafbat (penal battalion) or shtrafroty (penal company).

The maximum length of service in shtraf was 3 months as anything longer was considered a death sentence, so only prisoners with 10 years or less remaining were eligible.

Shtrafniki were also considered to have redeemed themselves with blood if they were wounded and were released into regular army units if so.

Recruiting for war in prisons as such thus has a precedent in Russia. But there is a massive innovation here. — Prisoners are being released into the custody of a private commercial enterprise.

And it is in exchange for a stint with a private commercial enterprise that the government promises them an official state pardon.

Why?

These are people who are in state custody and who are going to war for the pardon only the state can provide.

The state has all the power here. Wagner has no leverage.

Why doesn’t the state simply release these men into penal units of the military?

Why open up prisons to Wagner, use your pardon leverage for Wagner, and then pay Wagner for the privilege of running the men that you gave it?

Why not tie the pardon to service in some outfit organized by the state?

Why channel captive (literally) manpower to a private company you’ll then have to pay for managing the resource (to be crude) you provided it with?

I’ve never heard of anything more neo-liberal.

Working with mercenaries is eyebrow-raising to start with. But maybe there’s an argument for it in the sense that a mercenary company might have access to manpower that would otherwise be out of reach for you. For example, people who don’t like military discipline, but who don’t mind corporate discipline.

But what does Wagner bring to the table here?? These are literally your prisoners that only you can provide with the pardon they want.

I’ve heard of private prisons where the state pays a company to house and guard them because they’re able to do it for cheaper. (Which is iffy enough.)

And I’ve heard of private companies that employ convicts inside state prisons against compensation to prisoners and the state. (Which is open to abuse.)

But channeling your captive manpower into Wagner so that you can pay Wagner even more money for fielding more fighters, why is the middle man needed here??

This sounds like the most unnecessary and the most private-favoring public-private partnership ever.

This is as if you gifted a private company a gold mine for free, so that you can now pay the company for gold that until yesterday was yours.

Except it’s worse than that because here you’re engaging in radical experiments in the early release of criminals on top of that, and you’re doing it to enlarge the role of a private company in the field of dishing out violence that is supposedly solely state’s prerogative.

There is already a sense in the military and Rosgvardia that Wagner is privileged. That where Wagner is on the attack that shells and air support are always found to back it, while they themselves are all too often given the ungrateful tasks of defending the most neglected parts of the front.

Hell, Wagner already has a mini air force now. It is fielding Su-25 strike aircraft. Something that could have only been made possible with a direct transfer from the state.

With the state granting Wagner further privileges (a monopoly on captive manpower), what direction is the prestige and the morale of the military supposed to go from here?

https://twitter.com/SrbskyRus/status/1570179977794158594

https://twitter.com/SrbskyRus/status/1570185459233394696

Let’s not play dumb. We know there are reasons the state may prefer to work with Wagner rather than its own military.

One reason is that Wagner has a better reputation with potential fighters than the state. The military frequently fails to deliver on promised perks of the job like housing, and who is optimistic enough to fully trust the complicated bonus schemes promised by regions to 3rd Corps recruits? Going to war via Wagner or another mercenary route via the Chechens is regarded as safer.

Another reason might be the very lawlessness of the arrangement. The Soviets ran penal combat units but that was 70 years ago. Nobody in the Russian military today knows how to make a penal combat unit work.

Neither does Wagner, but Wagner operates in the grey area, so perhaps it is hoped that Wagner not being subject to oversight or having to follow military law can make up for the lack of procedures and experience with lawlessness. That is to say, if the shrafniki try to desert the Wagner PMC can deal with them in ways that military police or Rosgvardia — especially without written orders, or procedures drilled into them — would probably balk at. (Indeed in the video Prigozhin promises to summarily execute prisoners who change their minds in Ukraine.)

Finally, by working with a PMC the government can make corruption and inefficiency in the ranks not its problem. If the government spends resources on the upkeep of a military unit only to discover, once the unit has been called up, that the outfit sucks because the officers have been selling off the materials intended for training and maintenance then the government has a big problem on its hands.

But if the government pays Wagner to deliver a certain result and the latter fails, then the next time Wagner simply won’t get a contract.

The problem is, what happens when PMC stakeholders gain access to the highest reaches of the government? When the mercenaries fill their pockets to the extent that they can buy up officials? Or when high-ranking officials like Prigozhin and Kadyrov become shareholders in mercenary enterprises? Suddenly you have a section of influential people with the ear of Vladimir Putin with every incentive to darken the reputation of the military, to starve it of resources, and even to corrupt it further.

A private military might be more efficient and less corrupt than a state-owned one. Just like a private defense plant or a private oil drilling company might be. But does that mean that you end up with less corruption? No, it doesn’t. In practice what happens is simply that corruption migrates to a higher plane.

A state-owned defense plant burdens the budget through its lethargy, waste, and theft. But the “well-run” private defense plant buys up Congressmen and think tanks and then runs your budgetary and foreign policies.

What happens if the Wagner pie becomes so large that they can hand out lucrative ownership stakes to men in Putin’s inner circle? What happens when not just Prigozhin, but Medvedev, Sobyanin and Petrushev have an incentive to see the military humbled and Wagner ascendant?

Might we see a scenario where Russian draftees are presented with the choice of serving in either the regular military or Wagner? It would be surreal and I honestly don’t expect it, but it is also surreal that Moscow is handing out pardons to criminals to raise Wagner’s numbers. Who knows where this leads?

This is very weird and surreal stuff that is going on. Stuff that 6 months ago nobody predicted.

What would we say if in 2004 George Bush started pardoning criminals if they signed up for a 6-month stint with Blackwater in Iraq?

Mercenaries broke the ice in America, but it is in Russia that they have attained heights unseen before.

And what does that say about the nature of Putin’s rule? He was once regarded as a statist. Someone who is all about sovereignty, stability, procedure — and most of all state capacity. Well, I see very little of that left. More and more I see improvisation and neu-feudal wheeling and dealing.

I do wonder what a Soviet general from the 1980s who would have been a part of a staggering 3-million military — a massive monument to state capacity — would have made of a prediction that 40 years later Moscow would be reduced to opening its jails to a mercenary company in order to replenish its manpower. And that in a war for places like Kharkov and Odessa!

Putin once cracked down on private companies in oil extraction when they started hijacking the system to benefit themselves. It didn’t matter that they were legitimately well-run. Yet now, in the name of convenience and a little more efficiency, he is opening the door for private interest to take over parts of Russia’s military capacity.

Across the post-Socialist world, it is believed that when the old system fell the ex-Communist managers of state-owned companies intentionally ran them into the ground so they could acquire them on the cheap for themselves.

Well at the start of this war the Russian military was set up for failure. It was thrown into war without notice and the chance to prepare, told to cut a third of its manpower, spread out across numerous axes, without a unified command or operational plan, and to fight in direct contravention of its doctrine and structure — but was made to pursue numerous and extremely ambitious targets (Kiev, Nikolayev, Voznesensk, Sumy, Chernigov…) anyway. It continues to be set up for failure to this day as conscript manpower, which it is structurally built to rely on in a large war, is not made available to it. The result is that the military is in the doldrums and that Wagner and other mercenary connects are ascendant. Now that the state-run military has been discredited, the private militaries can flourish as never before.

I’m not going so far as to say it was a conspiracy. But if it were, what would be done any different?

 

This week it has become known that convicts in Russia are being released into Wagner mercenary company.

According to a Prigozhin recruitment speech in one of the penal colonies, prisoners are able to trade in their sentence for a 6-month stint with Wagner in the Ukraine.

After 6 months they receive an official pardon from the state.

Releasing prisoners into military service has a strong historic precedent in Russia. During World War 2 nearly one million gulag inmates were released into the Red Army.

Many started their service in shtraf or penal units. Inmates could exchange 3 to 5 years of their sentence for 1 month in a shtrafbat (penal battalion) or shtrafroty (penal company).

The maximum length of service in shtraf was 3 months as anything longer was considered a death sentence, so only prisoners with 10 years or less remaining were eligible.

Shtrafniki were also considered to have redeemed themselves with blood if they were wounded and were released into regular army units if so.

Recruiting for war in prisons as such thus has a precedent in Russia. But there is a massive innovation here. — Prisoners are being released into the custody of a private commercial enterprise.

And it is in exchange for a stint with a private commercial enterprise that the government promises them an official state pardon.

Why?

These are people who are in state custody and who are going to war for the pardon only the state can provide.

The state has all the power here. Wagner has no leverage.

Why doesn’t the state simply release these men into penal units of the military?

Why open up prisons to Wagner, use your pardon leverage for Wagner, and then pay Wagner for the privilege of running the men that you gave it?

Why not tie the pardon to service in some outfit organized by the state?

Why channel captive (literally) manpower to a private company you’ll then have to pay for managing the resource (to be crude) you provided it with?

I’ve never heard of anything more neo-liberal.

Working with mercenaries is eyebrow-raising to start with. But maybe there’s an argument for it in the sense that a mercenary company might have access to manpower that would otherwise be out of reach for you. For example, people who don’t like military discipline, but who don’t mind corporate discipline.

But what does Wagner bring to the table here?? These are literally your prisoners that only you can provide with the pardon they want.

I’ve heard of private prisons where the state pays a company to house and guard them because they’re able to do it for cheaper. (Which is iffy enough.)

And I’ve heard of private companies that employ convicts inside state prisons against compensation to prisoners and the state. (Which is open to abuse.)

But channeling your captive manpower into Wagner so that you can pay Wagner even more money for fielding more fighters, why is the middle man needed here??

This sounds like the most unnecessary and the most private-favoring public-private partnership ever.

This is as if you gifted a private company a gold mine for free, so that you can now pay the company for gold that until yesterday was yours.

Except it’s worse than that because here you’re engaging in radical experiments in the early release of criminals on top of that, and you’re doing it to enlarge the role of a private company in the field of dishing out violence that is supposedly solely state’s prerogative.

There is already a sense in the military and Rosgvardia that Wagner is privileged. That where Wagner is on the attack that shells and air support are always found to back it, while they themselves are all too often given the ungrateful tasks of defending the most neglected parts of the front.

Hell, Wagner already has a mini air force now. It is fielding Su-25 strike aircraft. Something that could have only been made possible with a direct transfer from the state.

With the state granting Wagner further privileges (a monopoly on captive manpower), what direction is the prestige and the morale of the military supposed to go from here?

https://twitter.com/SrbskyRus/status/1570179977794158594

https://twitter.com/SrbskyRus/status/1570185459233394696

Let’s not play dumb. We know there are reasons the state may prefer to work with Wagner rather than its own military.

One reason is that Wagner has a better reputation with potential fighters than the state. The military frequently fails to deliver on promised perks of the job like housing, and who is optimistic enough to fully trust the complicated bonus schemes promised by regions to 3rd Corps recruits? Going to war via Wagner or another mercenary route via the Chechens is regarded as safer.

Another reason might be the very lawlessness of the arrangement. The Soviets ran penal combat units but that was 70 years ago. Nobody in the Russian military today knows how to make a penal combat unit work.

Neither does Wagner, but Wagner operates in the grey area, so perhaps it is hoped that Wagner not being subject to oversight or having to follow military law can make up for the lack of procedures and experience with lawlessness. That is to say, if the shrafniki try to desert the Wagner PMC can deal with them in ways that military police or Rosgvardia — especially without written orders, or procedures drilled into them — would probably balk at. (Indeed in the video Prigozhin promises to summarily execute prisoners who change their minds in Ukraine.)

Finally, by working with a PMC the government can make corruption and inefficiency in the ranks not its problem. If the government spends resources on the upkeep of a military unit only to discover, once the unit has been called up, that the outfit sucks because the officers have been selling off the materials intended for training and maintenance then the government has a big problem on its hands.

But if the government pays Wagner to deliver a certain result and the latter fails, then the next time Wagner simply won’t get a contract.

The problem is, what happens when PMC stakeholders gain access to the highest reaches of the government? When the mercenaries fill their pockets to the extent that they can buy up officials? Or when high-ranking officials like Prigozhin and Kadyrov become shareholders in mercenary enterprises? Suddenly you have a section of influential people with the ear of Vladimir Putin with every incentive to darken the reputation of the military, to starve it of resources, and even to corrupt it further.

A private military might be more efficient and less corrupt than a state-owned one. Just like a private defense plant or a private oil drilling company might be. But does that mean that you end up with less corruption? No, it doesn’t. In practice what happens is simply that corruption migrates to a higher plane.

A state-owned defense plant burdens the budget through its lethargy, waste, and theft. But the “well-run” private defense plant buys up Congressmen and think tanks and then runs your budgetary and foreign policies.

What happens if the Wagner pie becomes so large that they can hand out lucrative ownership stakes to men in Putin’s inner circle? What happens when not just Prigozhin, but Medvedev, Sobyanin and Petrushev have an incentive to see the military humbled and Wagner ascendant?

Might we see a scenario where Russian draftees are presented with the choice of serving in either the regular military or Wagner? It would be surreal and I honestly don’t expect it, but it is also surreal that Moscow is handing out pardons to criminals to raise Wagner’s numbers. Who knows where this leads?

This is very weird and surreal stuff that is going on. Stuff that 6 months ago nobody predicted.

What would we say if in 2004 George Bush started pardoning criminals if they signed up for a 6-month stint with Blackwater in Iraq?

Mercenaries broke the ice in America, but it is in Russia that they have attained heights unseen before.

And what does that say about the nature of Putin’s rule? He was once regarded as a statist. Someone who is all about sovereignty, stability, procedure — and most of all state capacity. Well, I see very little of that left. More and more I see improvisation and neu-feudal wheeling and dealing.

I do wonder what a Soviet general from the 1980s who would have been a part of a staggering 3-million military — a massive monument to state capacity — would have made of a prediction that 40 years later Moscow would be reduced to opening its jails to a mercenary company in order to replenish its manpower. And that in a war for places like Kharkov and Odessa!

Putin once cracked down on private companies in oil extraction when they started hijacking the system to benefit themselves. It didn’t matter that they were legitimately well-run. Yet now, in the name of convenience and a little more efficiency, he is opening the door for private interest to take over parts of Russia’s military capacity.

Across the post-Socialist world, it is believed that when the old system fell the ex-Communist managers of state-owned companies intentionally ran them into the ground so they could acquire them on the cheap for themselves.

Well at the start of this war the Russian military was set up for failure. It was thrown into war without notice and the chance to prepare, told to cut a third of its manpower, spread out across numerous axes, without a unified command or operational plan, and to fight in direct contravention of its doctrine and structure — but was made to pursue numerous and extremely ambitious targets (Kiev, Nikolayev, Voznesensk, Sumy, Chernigov…) anyway. It continues to be set up for failure to this day as conscript manpower, which it is structurally built to rely on in a large war, is not made available to it. The result is that the military is in the doldrums and that Wagner and other mercenary connects are ascendant. Now that the state-run military has been discredited, the private militaries can flourish as never before.

I’m not going so far as to say it was a conspiracy. But if it were, what would be done any different?