Dublin-Monaghan Terrorist Attack

national | crime and justice | news report Thursday December 11, 2003 11:27 by Maubere

Here are the conclusions of the Barron Inquiry into the biggest crime in Ireland this century

Tithe an Oireachtais
An Comhchoiste um Dhlí agus Ceart, Comhionannas, Cosaint agus
Cearta na mBan
Tuarascáil Eatramhach maidir leis an Tuarascáil ón gCoimisiún
Fiosrúcháin Neamhspleách faoi Bhuamáil Bhaile Átha Cliath agus
Mhuineacháin
Nollaig 2003

Houses of the Oireachtas
Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights
Interim Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of
Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings
December 2003


http://www.gov.ie/oireachtas/frame.htm


CONCLUSIONS:

The conclusions of the Inquiry regarding the facts, circumstances, causes and
perpetrators of the bombings can be summarised as follows:

1. The Dublin and Monaghan bombings were carried out by two groups of
loyalist paramilitaries, one based in Belfast and the other in the area
around Portadown / Lurgan. Most, though not all of those involved were
members of the UVF.

2. It is likely that the bombings were conceived and planned in Belfast, with
the mid-Ulster element providing operational assistance.

3. The bombings were a reaction to the Sunningdale Agreement - in
particular to the prospect of a greater role for the Irish government in the
administration of Northern Ireland. The timing of the attacks may have
been inspired by a number of important events around that time including:

(i) a statement of the Taoiseach in April 1974 in which he expressed
the hope that formal ratification of the Agreement would take place
in May;
(ii) statements by Northern Ireland Secretary Merlyn Rees (also in
April) proposing the phasing out of internment and a gradual
reduction of the British Army presence in Northern Ireland;
(iii) the advent of the Ulster Workers Council strike.

4. A finding that members of the security forces in Northern Ireland could
have been involved in the bombings is neither fanciful nor absurd, given
the number of instances in which similar illegal activity has been proven.
287
However, the material assessed by the Inquiry is insufficient to suggest
that senior members of the security forces in Northern Ireland were in any
way involved in the bombings.

5. The loyalist groups who carried out the bombings in Dublin were capable
of doing so without help from any section of the security forces in
Northern Ireland, though this does not rule out the involvement of
individual RUC, UDR or British Army members.
The Monaghan bombing bears all the hallmarks of a standard loyalist
operation and required no assistance.

6. It is likely that the farm of James Mitchell at Glenanne played a significant
part in the preparation for the attacks. It is also likely that members of the
UDR and RUC either participated in, or were aware of those preparations.

7. The possibility that the involvement of such army or police officers was
covered-up at a higher level cannot be ruled out; but it is unlikely that any
such decision would ever have been committed to writing.

8. There is no evidence that any branch of the security forces knew in
advance that the bombings were about to take place. This has been
reiterated by the current Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and is
accepted by the Inquiry. If they did know, it is unlikely that there would be
any official records. Such knowledge would not have been written down;
or if it was, would not have been in any files made available to the
Secretary of State. There is evidence that the Secretary of State of the day
was not fully informed on matters of which he should have been made
aware. On that basis, it is equally probable that similarly sensitive
information might be withheld from the present holder of that office.

9. The Inquiry believes that within a short time of the bombings taking place,
the security forces in Northern Ireland had good intelligence to suggest
who was responsible. An example of this could be the unknown
information that led British Intelligence sources to tell their Irish Army
counterparts that at least two of the bombers had been arrested on 26 May
and detained. Unfortunately, the Inquiry has been unable to discover the
nature of this and other intelligence available to the security forces in
Northern Ireland at that time.

10. A number of those suspected for the bombings were reliably said to have
had relationships with British Intelligence and / or RUC Special Branch
officers. It is reasonable to assume that exchanges of information took
place. It is therefore possible that the assistance provided to the Garda
investigation team by the security forces in Northern Ireland was affected
by a reluctance to compromise those relationships, in the interests of
securing further information in the future.
But any such conclusion would require very cogent evidence. No such
evidence is in the possession of the Inquiry. There remains a deep
288
suspicion that the investigation into the bombings was hampered by such
factors, but it cannot be put further than that.

11. As stated, there are grounds for suspecting that the bombers may have had
assistance from members of the security forces. The involvement of
individual members in such an activity does not of itself mean the
bombings were either officially or unofficially state-sanctioned. If one
accepts that some people were involved, they may well have been acting
on their own initiative. Ultimately, a finding that there was collusion
between the perpetrators and the authorities in Northern Ireland is a matter
of inference. On some occasions an inference is irresistible or can be
drawn as a matter of probability. Here, it is the view of the Inquiry that this
inference is not sufficiently strong. It does not follow even as a matter of
probability. Unless further information comes to hand, such involvement
must remain a suspicion. It is not proven.