For the Record - WMD of biological types are illegal.

Saturday March 26, 2005 15:06

by for the record.

there is a lot of text here in 3 sections * today's EU declaration * the Convention * the US veto

Today marks the 30th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 26 March 1975. The BTWC was the first Convention to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, and is a key component of the international non-proliferation and disarmament framework. The European Union (EU) considers the BTWC to be the cornerstone of our efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins from ever being developed and used as weapons.

Since 1975, some 154 States have become a party to the Convention, underlining the continued importance of the BTWC in addressing current day threats. We call on all States not yet party to the Convention to do so without delay. The EU will continue its diplomatic efforts to promote universal adherence to the BTWC.

The EU is committed to the full implementation of all the Convention’s provisions. The EU fully supports, and continues to participate actively in, the current three-year work programme. We furthermore attach high priority to the reinforcement of the Convention and remain committed to developing measures to verify compliance with the BTWC. We look forward to the 6th Review Conference in 2006, which will be a good opportunity for all States Parties to review the operation of the Convention, to reiterate their commitment to the international norm against BW and to agree on measures to strengthen the BTWC, taking into account recent developments.

The EU welcomes further exchange of information and coordination with other international organisations to promote the aims of the Convention.

The EU furthermore recalls its commitment to implement its program aimed at protecting the EU population from the effects of attacks with, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.

The EU calls on this occasion for the universal adherence to all international disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, agreements and instruments.

http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/pesc/2005/03/26ciab/index.html

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the text of the convention:-

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

Article V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and cooperation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI

(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

Article X

(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Article XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XIV

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article may accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XV

This Convention, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding states.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this tenth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-two.

Signed at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10,1972
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate December 16, 1974
Ratified by U.S. President January 22, 1975
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow March 26, 1975
Proclaimed by U.S. President March 26, 1975

Entered into force March 26, 1975

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The BWC is a multilateral treaty of indefinite duration that is open to any country. Notably absent from the list of member states is Syria, a treaty signatory that the United States believes is probably developing biological weapons.

Implementation

The convention has been flagrantly violated in the past. The Soviet Union, a state-party and one of the convention's depositary states, maintained an enormous offensive biological weapons program after ratifying the BWC. Russia says that this program has been terminated, but questions remain about what happened to elements of the Soviet program. Iraq violated its commitments as a signatory state with its biological weapons program, which was uncovered by the UN Special Commission on Iraq after the Persian Gulf War. Iraq became a state-party after the war but is thought by the United States to be still violating the convention.

In November 2001, the United States publicly accused Iraq, as well as member state North Korea, of breaching the convention's terms. Washington also expressed concern about compliance by Iran and Libya, which are also states-parties, and by Syria. The United States itself raised concerns in 2001 about whether some of its activities, ostensibly being conducted as part of its biodefense program, are permitted under the BWC. In 2002, Washington added Cuba, also a state-party, to its list of countries conducting activities that violate the convention.

Efforts to Enhance Compliance

States-parties have convened a review conference about every five years to review and improve upon the treaty's implementation. In an effort to enhance confidence and promote cooperation among states-parties, at the second BWC review conference in 1986 member states agreed to implement a set of confidence-building measures. Under these politically binding measures, states should:

* Exchange data on high-containment research centers and laboratories or on centers and laboratories that specialize in permitted biological activities related to the convention.
* Exchange information on abnormal outbreaks of infectious diseases.
* Encourage the publication of biological research results related to the BWC and promote the use of knowledge gained from this research.
* Promote scientific contact on biological research related to the convention.

At the third BWC review conference in 1991, the scope of the first measure was expanded to include national biological defense programs and the second and fourth measures were slightly modified. In addition, three more measures were added to this list. States should:

* Declare legislation, regulations, and "other measures" pertaining to the BWC.
* Declare offensive or defensive biological research and development programs in existence since January 1, 1946.
* Declare vaccine production facilities.

These endeavors have been largely unsuccessful; the vast majority of states-parties have consistently failed to submit declarations on their activities and facilities.

The 1991 review conference also tasked a group of "governmental experts" to evaluate potential verification measures for use in a future compliance protocol to the BWC. The group subsequently considered 21 such measures and submitted a report to a special conference of states-parties in 1994. Building off this report, the conference tasked a second body, known as the Ad Hoc Group, with negotiating a legally binding protocol to the BWC to strengthen the convention.

The Protocol Regime and Negotiations

The Ad Hoc Group met from January 1995 to July 2001 and aimed to finish its work before the fifth review conference, which began in November 2001. During the course of the negotiations, the group developed a protocol that envisioned states submitting to an international body declarations of treaty-relevant facilities and activities. That body would conduct routine on-site visits to declared facilities and could conduct challenge inspections of suspect facilities and activities as well.

However, a number of fundamental issues—such as the scope of on-site visits and the role export controls would play in the regime—proved difficult to resolve. In March 2001, the Ad Hoc Group's chairman issued a draft protocol containing language attempting to strike a compromise on disputed issues.

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But in July 2001, at the Ad Hoc Group's last scheduled meeting, the United States rejected the draft and any further protocol negotiations, claiming such a protocol could not help strengthen compliance with the BWC and could hurt U.S. national security and commercial interests.

The fifth BWC review conference, which many experts thought could resolve the fate of the Ad Hoc Group, was suspended on its last day, December 7, 2001, after the United States tabled a controversial proposal to terminate the Ad Hoc Group's mandate and replace it with an annual meeting of BWC states-parties. It is uncertain whether the Ad Hoc Group will meet again. The United States is the only country that publicly favors revoking the group's mandate. The review conference will reconvene in November 2002. The states-parties resumed the fifth review conference in November 2002. The participants failed to agree on any verification measures, including the proposed protocol. The states-parties agreed instead to hold three meetings before the next review conference in 2006. They will discuss nonproliferation measures during the meetings, but the agenda does not include any discussion of verification measures. No decision was taken regarding the Ad Hoc Group, and its future remains unclear.
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1. The forum, the Committee on Disarmament, is now known as the Conference on Disarmament.
Parties and Signatories of the Biological Weapons Convention

States-Parties: 150

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria (1)
Bahamas
Bahrain (1)
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam (2)
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Cambodia
Canada
Cape Verde
Chile
China (3)
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Democratic Republic of Congo
Denmark
Dominica (2)
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gambia
Georgia
Germany

Ghana
Greece
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea-Bissau
Holy See
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Kuwait
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia, Former
Yugoslav Republic of
Malaysia (1)
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritius
Mexico
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Netherlands (4)
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
North Korea
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea

Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Solomon Islands (2)
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
United Kingdom (6)
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zimbabwe

Signatory States: 14

Central African Republic
Cote d'Ivoire
Egypt
Gabon
Guyana
Haiti
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Myanmar (Burma)
Nepal
Somalia
Syria
United Arab Emirates(5)

Sources: State Department, United Nations

1. With reservation.
2. Based on general declarations concerning treaty obligations applicable prior to independence.
3. Effective January 1, 1979, the United States recognized the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China. The authorities on Taiwan state they will continue to abide by the provisions of the convention, and the United States regards them as bound by its obligations.
4. Applicable to the Netherlands' Antilles and Aruba.
5. The United Arab Emirates, which did not ratify the convention, is listed as one country.
6. Extended to territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom and to New Hebrides. Continued application to Vanuatu not determined.

Links:-

http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/bwc/text/bwc.htm
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwcataglance.asp
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/uk_wmd/407ap29.htm
declarations & reservations-
http://www.opbw.org/convention/btwcres.html
Australia
http://www.dfat.gov.au/security/biological_weapons.html
last article on WMD -
http://www.indymedia.ie/newswire.php?story_id=69046